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Explosive ordnance risk education is provided to children in Syria.
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Celebrating 25 Years of Improving Lives!

A NOTE FROM INTERIM DIRECTOR
SUZANNE FIEDERLEIN
At the end of another challenging year, we celebrate
the accomplishments of an innovative community of
practice keen to adapt and evolve to the challenges of
an ever-changing landscape.
This issue of The Journal of Conventional Weapons
Destruction encompasses well-timed articles on new
solutions to past and present challenges, critical
observations on personal protective equipment (PPE)
and explosive ordnance risk education (EORE), and
compelling cases for operational changes involving environmental risks and
explosive hazards clearance.
New Funding and Record-Keeping Solutions. Camille Wallen (The
HALO Trust, HALO), Peter Nicholas, and Anna von Griesheim (Social Finance)
discuss challenges facing the mine action sector and three approaches their
team developed as alternative finance mechanisms.
Philip Alpers from the Centre for Armed Violence Reduction presents
ArmsTracker, a low-cost, digitized record-keeping solution to help lowcapacity states prevent diversion and illicit use of state-owned arms, ammu
nition, and explosives.
Accident Reporting and Advances in PPE. Lillian Gates, FrasureKruzel-Drew Memorial Fellow at the U.S. Department of State’s Office of
Weapons Removal and Abatement in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
(PM/WRA), details the Accident Review Panel, the latest effort from PM/
WRA to standardize accident response protocols and the collection of accident data.
Commenting on the lack of progress in PPE in mine action, Norwegian
People’s Aid’s Kyaw Lin Htut analyzes the technical and operational limitations of existing deminer equipment, calling for considerations of future PPE
to improve protection without reducing deminer effectiveness while also
accounting for gender-considerations, environmental degradation of expired
PPE, and cost-effectiveness.
Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE). Sebastian Kasack
(Mines Advisory Group, MAG) reflects on the lessons learned by the mine
action sector to effectively influence lasting behavior change in people
whose daily lives expose them to explosive contamination. His observations
on how to best tailor EORE to account for gender, cultural, and diversity sensitivities are timely and relevant in today’s world.
HALO’s Kim Fletcher and India McGrath present their findings from a barrier analysis conducted in Mosul, Iraq, that looked at the constraints preventing the adoption of safe behaviors of youth. Their findings suggest ways
to develop specific messaging and delivery techniques to improve EORE
materials.
Environmental Concerns and Underwater UXO Remediation.
Shedding light on the importance of effective risk management and climate
adaption principles, Linsey Cottrell (Conflict and Environment Observatory)
and Carlie Stowe (PeaceTrees Vietnam) discuss how we can limit the impact of
climate change-related risks and build more resilient communities.
Chris Price (Oklahoma State University) addresses the opportunities for
multi-sector strategies in underwater unexploded ordnance remediation
activities, commenting on the strengths of various entities and highlighting
areas for potential cross-sector collaboration.
Nigeria Photo Essay. MAG’s Sean Sutton documents the “Hidden Crisis
in Borno State” in his latest photo essay featuring Nigeria. His work depicts
the daily realties for those living in local government areas where resources
are scarce and humanitarian access is insufficient.
Mechanical Equipment. From their experience clearing improvised
explosive devices (IEDs) in Iraq, Pehr Lodhammar and Mark Wilkinson (United
Nations Mine Action Service) maintain that mechanical equipment have a
clear role in IED disposal. Their article looks at the various factors involved
in using mechanical assets as well as future considerations and opportunities
for development.
The Journal is soliciting for a myriad of topics this coming year, ranging from the application of forensic science in humanitarian mine action to
regional focuses on Southeast Asia, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and the Nagorno
Karabakh region. For more information, see our Calls for Papers at https://
www.jmu.edu/cisr/journal/cfps.shtml.
As the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery celebrates its
25th year of operations, so too do we celebrate a diverse field of practitioners
who contribute to the crucial work of mine action. Stay safe and best wishes
to those across the globe working to make the world a safer place from explosive weapons contamination.
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for Mine Action
By Camille Wallen [ The HALO Trust ],
Peter Nicholas, and Anna von Griesheim [ Social Finance ]

A

chieving a world free of landmines will require at least US$1 billion in additional funding.
Bridging this gap will require using all available funding sources and maximizing the efficiency
of spending. Innovative finance can help achieve both aims by accessing funding not traditionally available for mine action. To explore these options further, the UK government commissioned
work to examine the potential roles of innovative finance in mine action. After discussions with a
range of stakeholders, a broad consensus emerged around three approaches. First, outcomes finance,
whereby funding disburses against independently verified results, such as mine clearance and recovery of activity on cleared land; the focus on results incentivizes effective implementation. Second,
outcomes-based public private partnerships, whereby a government transfers land to the private sector conditional on mine clearance, with in some cases the government (or a donor) also subsidizing restoration of productive activity on the land, conditional on achievement of goals such as employment
creation. Third, front-loaded funding, whereby donors make long-term pledges of annual funding to
mine action; highly rated bonds are then issued to finance more immediate mine action by securitizing
the long-term pledges.
It is estimated that there is a US$1 billion shortfall in funding
to deliver the 2025 aspiration of a world free of landmines. There
is also an imbalance in funding, which limits progress that some
mine-affected countries can make towards becoming mine free.
The funding gap is likely to increase due to budgetary pressures on
traditional donors caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Though it is
challenging, this means that it is even more important that alternative funding mechanisms be developed. Donors and national mine
authorities will need to be creative and innovative, and everyone
will need to contribute.
Over the past few years there has been plenty of discussion in the
broader development community around “alternative development
financing.” However this has not been the case in the mine action
community. It is worth recalling the Political Declaration agreed

to by States Parties in Oslo at the end of 2019: “We will explore
options for new and alternative sources of funding with a view
to increasing the resources available to realize the Convention’s
aims.”1 This commitment is also contained in Action 42 of the Oslo
Action Plan.2
With this in mind, the UK Foreign, Commonwealth &
Development Office brought together a team including Social
Finance3 and The HALO Trust4 to look at how innovative finance
could accelerate mine clearance while improving its efficiency. The
team talked to a range of governments, nongovernment organizations (NGOs), and private sector stakeholders, and found a broad
consensus as to the current challenges affecting funding, and how
new financing mechanisms could improve funding and incentivize
more effective mine action implementation.

Challenges
Six challenges to more effective mine action came up repeatedly
in the team’s discussions:
• Inadequate funding for mine action, partly because mine
clearance is not always seen as a development need
• Funding structures that do not incentivize efficient implementation of mine action
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•
•
•
•

Short-term, uncertain funding leading to difficulties in effective planning
Insufficient data on the benefits of mine action
Sometimes weak national ownership for mine action and
inadequate linkages to broader development planning
Sub-optimal coordination within and between donor
governments.

Making Mine Action More Efficient and Effective
The stakeholder discussions led to the development of innovative financing mechanisms that held strong promise of overcoming these challenges. Once preliminary versions of the
mechanisms were ready, they were further developed against

the specific challenges faced in representative case study countries—Afghanistan, Angola, and Cambodia—with the invaluable contribution of national mine authorities and other country
stakeholders.

Mechanism 1: Outcomes Finance
Traditional grant finance disburses against inputs with payments often not, or only marginally, linked to results. By contrast,
outcomes finance disburses against independently verified results,
such as mine clearance and recovery of social and economic activity on land cleared of mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW).
Outcomes finance could also potentially disburse against victim
assistance and risk education, although measuring success may be
more difficult.
What is outcomes finance? By definition, outcomes finance
focuses on results rather than means, making it a powerful tool
to incentivize flexible, adaptive implementation geared to achieving results rather than following rigid log-frames. It could bring
together disparate actors to finance effective and efficient mine
action, and hold service providers to account with rigorous and
independently verified data on results. The broadest form of outcomes finance is an outcomes fund, which makes pooled funding
available for any qualifying program that aims to achieve defined
objectives, such as restoration of activity on cleared land. Funds
can be made available competitively, so that only the most promising and cost-effective proposals are offered funding against prospective achievement of defined goals.
Outcomes funding pays ex-post, so there is a need for a source
of working/risk capital to cover the gap between program funding
and payment for the results the program has achieved. This capital
can come from service providers themselves, or from an impact
bond, which sources external risk capital from a development
financial institution (DFI) and social investors, and potentially has
additional advantages discussed in Section 2 on paycheck protection programs (PPPs). Investors are attracted to impact bonds by
the mix of financial and social returns (paid by the donors/outcomes payers upon successful achievement of outcomes), and the
potential to introduce a more dynamic, adaptive, and effective way
of managing development programs.
Especially where the capital comes from service providers themselves, there is a need for early payments on outputs. For mine
clearance organizations it might make sense for donors to pay
them the full costs of the clearance on completion of the outputs,
with a bonus (paid by the donor/outcomes payer) when final outcomes are achieved (to encourage collaboration with other actors).
Outcomes finance of any form can coalesce different departments within a single donor behind the common goal of achieving
agreed results and can help bring similar cohesion to recipient governments and service providers. It can also play a role in facilitating

collaboration between donors behind shared objectives. Greater
national ownership is also encouraged by having the progress of
national programs measured objectively and publicly.
Making payment conditional on objectively measured mine
action results—including broader development benefits—could
also help secure new and enlarged donor funding by (a) reassuring
donors skeptical of the cost-effectiveness of mine action compared
to other development programs (since they only pay on achievement of outcomes), and (b) reassuring donors that the benefits of
mine action will be measured with rigorous and independently
verified metrics.
Outcomes finance in practice: an example. Results payments
in an outcomes finance structure would likely be made against
independently evaluated outcomes, for example, restoration of
economic and social activity. As illustrated in Figure 1, donors create a pooled outcomes fund that supports both mine clearance and
restoration of economic activity on cleared land (in this example,
sustainable agriculture).
The fact that there are payments against an end-stage results,
in this case restoration of agriculture, motivates mine action and
rural development service providers to find ways to work together.
This is because some or all payments to both are dependent on
achieving a common goal (to make the model workable, mine
clearance operatives would receive almost all their funding against
achievement of cleared land, with an incentive bonus for ultimate
achievement of economic and social objectives). Demining obviously has to precede restoration of farming or livestock, but the
work of preparing for that restoration—for example, design of
training and provision of agricultural tools and seeds—needs to
begin before demining is completed. This is particularly important
where beneficiaries include ex-combatants who may have no previous agricultural experience.
Where the political economy allows, an outcomes fund could
also work to align interests, facilitate cooperation, and pool funding between neighboring countries to clear border land. This alignment of interests would facilitate mine action planning across a
region, in turn helping to increase the effectiveness and efficiencies
of the program, and potentially enhancing stabilization.
Benefits of the model. Outcomes finance brings a more flexible and adaptive approach to implementation. With accountability linked to results rather than inputs, service providers have
the freedom and the incentive to continuously adapt and improve
their implementation, without the need to seek funders’ approval
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Donors

Financing the Outcomes Fund

Overview of key steps:

Financial ﬂows
In-kind support

1

Donors commit funds and
agree on desired outcomes

2

Outcomes Fund runs
procurement process to select
promising programmes(1)

3

Investors provide upfront
investment for service
provider to run the service

4

Results are independently
veriﬁed and claimed for payment

5

Outcomes Fund disburses
outcomes payments based on
independent veriﬁcation

6

Service providers use outcomes
payment to continue operation
and/or repay investors

1

Investors

Outcomes Fund

Only needed if service providers
require working/risk capital to
finance delivery of outcomes

Disbursing against verified
outcomes

2

3

5

Services Providers
Mine/ERW Clearance Contractors
and/or agriculture support

Upfront
investment if
needed by service
providers

4
6

Repayment
based on
outcomes
achieved

(1) Programs can be run by a service provider independently or with the ﬁnancial support of an investor, in which case it becomes an impact bond

Figure 1. (Example) Outcomes fund for restoration of sustainable agriculture on contaminated land.
(within fiduciary and safeguard norms). This flexibility is crucial
in mine action where the return of land, whether rural or urban,
to effective economic and social activity may depend on close collaboration across a broad spectrum of actors, including direct beneficiaries, financial institutions, value chains, extension agents/
business development support (BDS) providers, etc.
Outcomes finance also encourages longer planning horizons,
bringing more predictability and efficiency to both governments
and service providers by guaranteeing finance against completion
of a defined task. Indeed, one option in countries close to being
mine free is for donors to make payments (or a significant bonus
payment) against mine clearance completion nationwide or in a
defined region.
Further, outcomes finance also has the potential to strengthen
national ownership of mine action; as it can, through the choice
of outcomes, be aligned directly with national priorities. Where
a broad range of development outcomes are selected, it could
also help to catalyze increased collaboration between ministries.

Accurate reporting of mine clearance is encouraged by the linkage
to subsequent successful use of the land.
Challenges to overcome. Introducing any new finance model
incurs challenges that will need to be carefully planned for. These
challenges include
• Lack of expertise with innovative financing instruments,
including in planning for and managing outcomes-based
payments; nonetheless impact bonds have been successfully
introduced across a range of sectors in nineteen low- and
middle-income countries over the past seven years.5
• Patchy current measurement of mine action outcomes;
accurate and on-time reporting of outcomes is one of the
central capacity-building elements of any results-based
financing instrument.
• Risk that financing becomes the primary focus rather than
activities and outcomes, particularly if there are multiple
stakeholders; this underlines the need for the payment
incentive structure to be carefully aligned with broad mine
action goals.

Mechanism 2: Outcomes-Based, Public-Private Partnerships
Any significant return of safe, private sector activity to currently
mined land will require subsidies, both for mine clearance itself
and also in many cases to support the initial investment in productive economic activity on the cleared land. However, traditional
input-based subsidies, especially those to private enterprises, are
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notorious for misallocating resources and creating perverse incentives. Outcome-based subsidies, on the other hand, directly reward
achievement of a defined result, rather than subsidizing inputs that
may or may not help achieve that result. An outcomes-based PPP
model is designed to support and incentivize both mine clearance

agriculture extension, business development services, and skills training for
Making payments to
Providing land to investors
Implact Bond Investors
potential employees. The risk with tra1
1
ditional approaches to providing these
Land transfer
Payments on achievement
services is that they have a relatively
upon successful
of outcomes
clearance
(e.g. income or employment)
poor record worldwide of alignment
Financial Flows
Investors
3
with the real needs of the intended ben3
Financing projects
Land Transfer
eficiaries (farmers, small- and mediumproducing income
Impact Bond Investors
and employment
sized enterprises [SMEs], potential
Service Provision
2
employees, etc.), and therefore often
2
fail to achieve significant economic or
Mine/ERW
SMEs or
Service Providers
social impact. Outcomes finance, on the
e.g. agriculture extension,
Clearance
Commercial
other hand, has been shown to support
skills training
Contractors
Agriculture
Clears land for
investment
service provision in a way that aligns
it more closely with the needs of benOverview of key steps:
eficiaries. This alignment is achieved by
Impact Bond
PPP
rewarding service providers only when
Government enters into
Outcomes funders enter into agreement
1
agreed end-results in terms of income
1
agreement with investors
with Impact Bond investors (outcomes contract)
and employment are achieved, rather
Investors pay for mine action
than for providing a service whether or
activities and invest on clear land
2
Investors provide funding for activities
2
for productive activities
not it actually meets the supposed bento service providers
eficiaries’ needs.
Government transfers land
Outcomes Fund disburses outcomes
3
3
ownership upon land clearance
In practice, most service providpayments based on independent verification
ers experience difficulty in borrowing
significant amounts of working/risk
Figure 2. Example of an impact bond PPP model.
capital to bridge the funding gap until
and subsequent private sector, for-profit, investment. The founda- (hopefully) payments for outcomes are received. In these circumtion of the approach is transfer of land to the private sector, con- stances an Impact Bond (shown on the right of Figure 2) is one
ditional on successful mine clearance, creating the conditions for promising solution.
investment and subsequent socioeconomic development (thanks to
Benefits of the model. An outcomes-based public-private partChris Mathias of the British Asian Trust for this suggestion).
nership model shares many of the same benefits as the outcomes
Outcomes-based, public-private partnerships in practice: finance model noted previously, including potential for greater
an example. Specifically, the proposal is that the government com- flexibility and adaptability, enhanced national ownership, and
mits to transferring ownership of part or all of a plot of contami- improved predictability and efficiency. Furthermore, an outcomesnated land to a private investor upon successful mine clearance based public-private partnership has the potential to break down
financed by that investor. Where land is highly valuable and con- siloes between national government entities, donor agencies, and
tamination relatively easy to clear, the investor might be expected organizations working within and outside of the mine action sector
to receive only a portion of the land from the government in return (education or agriculture) by aligning interests and incentives.
for clearance, paying market price for the remainder. Conversely,
Impact bonds rely on external private investors to provide the risk/
where land is less valuable and more expensive to clear, the gov- working capital that service providers often cannot reasonably afford.
ernment may need to forgo any payment from the investor for the Relying on experienced external capital has the further advantage
land, and pay a portion of the cost of mine clearance as well. This of allowing an increased degree of flexibility, adaptation, and pruapproach is shown on the left-hand side of Figure 2.
dent risk-taking from service providers, compared to self-financing.
The transfer of ownership of cleared land may be incentive Impact bond capital typically comes from development fund instituenough on its own to foster not only mine clearance but also invest- tions (DFIs) and private sector social financiers who hire experienced
ment on the demined land. However, in many cases these incen- performance managers who use real-time data to facilitate quick and
tives may not be sufficient to generate investment that contributes continuous learning and adaptation to reach the agreed payment metmeaningfully to government goals of additional employment and rics. By contrast, where the working capital derives from the service
income, especially for vulnerable groups.
providers themselves, they are often unwilling and/or unable to take
In such cases where additional temporary subsidies are needed the calculated risks of a more flexible and adaptive approach, and are
to ensure optimal productive use of the cleared land, additional often unable to make the necessary use of real-time data compared to
subsidized support could be provided through services such as performance managers hired by external investors.
Government

Outcome Funder
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An impact bond for skills training in Palestine provides an example of how this approach can better align service provision with the
actual needs of the private sector. In this impact bond, the World
Bank is disbursing against (inter alia) trainees securing long-term
employment. This has incentivized skills training providers to work
closely and proactively with potential employers from the design of
the training to the initial apprenticeship. Similarly, conditioning
payment for business development service (BDS) and agriculture
extension on productivity improvements would incentivize service
provision that is much more closely and actively tailored to the real
needs of the beneficiaries.
As illustrated in Figure 2, an investor puts in risk/working capital to finance capacity building for the SMEs and their potential
employees (for example, BDS and skills training). An outcomes
funder provides conditional finance against verified outcomes such
as increased employment.

Where feasible, alignment between service providers and investors
would be further increased by having a single investor (or investor
group) investing in both the impact bond and the mine clearance and
SMEs/commercial agriculture.
Challenges to overcome. To ensure that goals and target
groups are in line with government priorities, this model would
need to be implemented in close coordination with both development and mine clearance entities within the government.
In addition to the challenges identified previously
• The applications of the PPP model must be carefully designed
so that they unlock private funding without compromising
national goals and requirements.
• Modalities of the collaboration with private companies will
likewise need to be handled sensitively so as to be in line with
national aspirations and standards.
• There is a risk of corruption in the land transactions, and
transparency will therefore need to be a key element in the
model’s application.

Mechanism 3: Front-loading funding
What is front-loading funding? A funding mechanism to

front-load finance based on multi-year donor pledges could be
used to improve continuity and planning for mine action programs, and also enable longer-term outcomes to be measured. The
International Finance Facility for Immunisation (IFFIm) approach
could be applied to mine clearance, as it also employs quantifiable,
finite results. This model would have a particular benefit in supporting the accelerated completion of mine clearance in a country,
region, or other defined geography.
Front-loading funding in practice: an example. IFFIm (the
model for this analysis) is designed to accelerate disbursement of
funds to achieve more rapid dividends, while spreading the cost to
donors over a much longer period. In the case of mine action there
would be four elements:
1. Donor governments make long-term, irrevocable, and
legally-binding pledges of annual funding to mine action.
2. By using, for example, the World Bank as treasury manager,
these long-term pledges support the issuance of highly-rated
bonds, allowing the securitization of future pledges, and
thus more rapid results on the ground.
3. Funds are disbursed for priority mine clearance programs.
4. The selection of mine clearance programs for funding, and
the management of disbursing funds, is governed by an alliance (in the case of IFFIm it is Gavi, The Vaccine Alliance),
with a board that brings together key actors including recipient countries, donors, implementing organizations, and UN
agencies.
Benefits of front-loading funding. This model brings a number of benefits for donors and recipient countries as it provides
accelerated funding to maximize impact and reduce the costs of
interventions. The stable, multi-year funding, aligned to national
completion plans, facilitates the planning of activities and
enhances national ownership by giving beneficiary states a seat at
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the table. It also delivers on grand bargain objectives.6 It allows
for more rapid achievement of humanitarian and economic benefits,
thus potentially appealing to donors who do not want to be involved
in the long-haul of funding individual mine action programs.
While the same result could be achieved if donors were able to supply all of the required funding upfront, IFFIm has proven that donors
are willing to make long-term pledges where immediate funding is
not available. The legal and administrative mechanisms for making
such legally-binding pledges is already in place for ten donors from
their funding for IFFIm.
While there is a small cost to front loading from bond issuance
costs and interest on the bond (although this will be low because of
the strong sovereign credit rating of likely donors), there are four key
benefits:
• significant saving of lives and in preventing of disabilities
• efficiency gains from the economies of scale that can be
achieved from faster mine clearance
• administrative cost savings in being able to wind down
national mine action agencies earlier
• sovereign bond interest rates, even without any of the benefits noted previously and purely in net present value (NPV)
terms, benefit to accelerating the gains from mine action, as
the NPV discount rate far exceeds current sovereign bond
interest rates
The proposed approach could also attract new funders, who
would see immediate benefits without a significant immediate
call on aid resources. For some funders there is also the potential attraction that it does not require the added complexity of
involvement of the private sector, either as investors in an impact
bond or as partners in a PPP.
Challenges to be overcome. IFFIm has major administrative
overheads, but it becomes a cost-effective model at a value of about

Investors

Financial ﬂows
Camille Wallen
Directory of Strategy
The HALO Trust

Bond
issuance

Front-loading facility

(holding investors fund and managing
disbursement and repayment)

Funders

(muliyear pledges from donors)

Governing Alliance
(coordinating fund use
and programme
implementation)

Service Providers

Figure 3. Front-loaded finance model.
$100 million or more in pledges. A mine clearance fund could
bring this threshold down considerably by initially focusing on a
small group of countries and a restricted set of donors. In addition,
the Mine Action Fund would only finance mine clearance, whereas
IFFIm finances fifteen distinct programs. By focusing on one, easilymeasurable objective, the management costs would be greatly
reduced. In addition, there is potential for further streamlining by
having the fund disburse on an outcomes basis; in that case the
Fund would simply pay out against progress towards mine-free status with a bonus on completion. Risk capital could be supplied by
an impact bond.

Next Steps
To make these mechanisms a reality that could materially
advance mine action globally, they will need to be piloted, potentially in one or more of the countries used as case studies in developing the mechanisms: Afghanistan, Angola, and Cambodia. The
team’s full report6 identifies in detail the steps needed to move
towards piloting, but the key is to rapidly bring together major
stakeholders in pilot countries to start turning these models into
transformative reality.
Interested parties are encouraged to contact Joe Shapiro, Mine
Action Lead, UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office,
joe.shapiro@fcdo.gov.uk.
See endnotes page 70
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EXPLORATORY STUDY

on the Current Limitations of
Personal Protective Equipment
and the Potential for Innovation
By Kyaw Lin Htut [ Norwegian People’s Aid ]

P

ersonal protective equipment (PPE) in mine action typically consists of a polycarbonate visor
that fully covers the face and front neck, and body armor consisting of an apron made of aramid
fabric (i.e., Kevlar) that fully covers the front torso, groin, and neck. PPE used in mine action is
generally considered as “the last line of defense” since the primary method through which accidental
deaths and injuries are prevented is through the application of and adherence to appropriate standard
operating procedures (SOPs). However, with any operations, there is always an element of “acceptable
risk,” and universal adherence to all SOPs at all times by all mine action personnel is not realistic. Thus,
the primary purpose of PPE is to minimize harm rather than prevent it. This must be balanced with factors such as weight, mobility, visibility, and to a lesser extent, cost.

In volume 22, issue 1 of this publication, Andy Smith observed
that there has been a lack of progress in PPE development for the
last twenty years. He attributes this to a combination of factors
including
• “Lack of demand.”
• “The current risk is thought tolerable.”
• “More immediate ways to manage risk.”1
Smith further notes that this trend has not been ideal, and that
improvements to PPE technologies and usage should address four
needs, namely
• “reduce the severity of blast injuries…[by adopting]…

Norway to investigate the criteria for and facilitate the development
of the “Next generation of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) in
Mine Action and Disarmament.” To that end, this paper expounds
upon Smith’s analysis, further identifying and considering some
of the major limitations in the current generation of PPE typically
used in the mine action sector. This paper explores the technical
limitations of the materials used as well the operational constraints
and in doing so, develops a framework through which next generation PPE suited to mine action operations can be developed.

blast resistant hand-tools”

•

“reduce eye loss…[through]…invention of improved
visor material”

• “increase body protection”
• “allow end-users to compare products”
Furthermore, the current generation of PPE used in mine action
is geared towards threats that were more common in previous
years (i.e., anti-personnel [AP] blast mines). As conflicts, threats,
and mine action activities evolve, for instance with the increasing
use of IEDs and greater emphasis on cluster munitions and other
unexploded ordnance (UXO) clearance (particularly in populated
areas), there needs to be periodic review to ensure that the current generation of PPE is “fit for purpose.” As mine action activities
have progressed beyond the clearance of primarily AP mines, the
need for a new generation of PPE becomes apparent as evolving
threats, environmental impact, and gender inclusivity should be
taken into account.
Hoping to further clarify and fulfill these needs in 2021,
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) received a grant from Innovation
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Male NPA deminer in Bosnia and Herzegovina
conducting clearance while wearing aramid body armor
and a polycarbonate visor.
All images courtesy of Norwegian People’s Aid.

High-Velocity Fragmentation Threats
High-velocity fragmentation2 presents a unique challenge in
humanitarian mine action (HMA)3 due to the fact that most
PPE used in HMA is typically not rated to defeat this threat.
According to International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) 10.304
the minimum standard of body armor must be at least NATO
Standardization Agreement (STANAG) 2920 compliant to V50 450
at 1.102 g, meaning that the material must reliably stop 50 percent
of incoming projectiles with a mass of up to 1.102 g travelling at 450
m/s. IMAS 10.30 does not specify that visors need to be STANAG
2920 rated, only that “the eye protection shall be capable of retaining integrity against the blast effects of 240 g of TNT at 60 cm
and shall provide protection equivalent to not less than 5 mm of
untreated polycarbonate” (IMAS 10.30, 2013).5 With this in mind,
however, it must be noted that the PPE used in HMA is primarily
intended to mitigate the effects of secondary fragmentation6 from
AP blast mines rather than high-velocity fragmentation. Although
the technology to defeat high-velocity (i.e., rifle) projectiles widely
exists in the form of ceramic-composite or high-hardness steel, the
significant added weight, loss of flexibility, and bulk (some plates
are as thick as 25 mm) for a limited coverage area and high cost
of procurement are significant drawbacks to widespread adoption.
Although large caliber ordnance such as artillery shells produce
high-velocity fragmentation,7 this paper will only refer to smaller
AP items such as cluster munitions, grenades, and AP fragmentation mines encountered during HMA operations. The reason for
excluding larger caliber items is that the probability of survival of
a point blank (i.e., within 1 m) detonation of a large caliber projectile (with more than 1 kg of high explosive) is virtually zero,
while survival of a point blank detonation of smaller items such
as AP fragmentation mines, grenades, or cluster munitions have
been extensively documented by NPA and the mine action sector
as a whole.
Using this criteria, there have been in total fourteen highvelocity fragmentation accidents involving cluster munitions, AP
fragmentation mines, and grenades resulting in sixteen casualties
documented in NPA’s database from January 1994 to April 2020.
These accidents have resulted in the deaths of eight victims and
non-fatal injuries to eight survivors. Of the eight fatalities, five8
were not wearing any torso PPE (i.e., body armor) or facial PPE
(i.e., visor) and all five received fatal penetrative injuries to the
torso as well as fatal head injuries from high-velocity fragmentation. Of the three fatalities who were wearing body armor, two of
the victims had parts of their body armor compromised, while one
did not have their body armor compromised and received no torso
injuries (the victim received penetrative head injuries). Of the two
fatalities with compromised body armor, one received undocumented non-life-threatening injuries to the torso and one received
life-threatening injuries to the torso. All three fatalities were wearing a polycarbonate visor, which had been compromised causing
fatal head/facial injuries to the victim.

Of the eight survivors of accidents involving high-velocity fragmentation over the same period, seven were wearing both body
armor and visors. The remaining individual who was not wearing
any PPE had survived due to their location behind another (unprotected) victim who did not survive.9 Of the seven survivors wearing
body armor, two had their vests compromised and suffered penetrative torso injuries. Two of those who did not have their body
armor compromised still received penetrative torso wounds due to
side impact in areas not covered by their PPE, but survived these
injuries. The visors worn by seven survivors were not compromised, although three received superficial facial injuries and one
survivor lost an eye due to blast overpressure and debris entering
their visor.
While sixteen individuals is too small of a sample size to establish any statistical or causal relationship, the anecdotal information from NPA’s records indicate that ten of the sixteen individuals
involved in high-velocity fragmentation accidents were wearing
PPE, seven of whom survived with varying degrees of injuries (70
percent survival). Body armor was compromised in four out of
these ten cases (40 percent) with victims receiving injuries to the
torso, with two out of the four victims surviving those injuries (50
percent survived despite their body armor being compromised).
Visors were compromised in three out of the ten cases (30 percent)
with victims receiving injuries to the head or face; none of the victims survived these injuries. By contrast, of the six victims who
were not wearing PPE, only one survived (16 percent survival).
While the information provided from these accidents does not
take into account the method of injury and circumstances that
could be aggravating or mitigating factors (i.e., victim position,

Male NPA deminer in Bosnia and Herzegovina wearing
aramid body armor and a ballistic helmet with a
polycarbonate visor.
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fragmentation mass/density, velocity, angles, quality of casualty
evacuation (CASEVAC), etc.) or the severity of injuries and lasting disabilities, it anecdotally illustrates that personnel wearing
PPE do have higher survival rates in accidents involving highvelocity fragmentation, even if the PPE is compromised. However,
personnel who have compromised visors from high-velocity fragmentation had significantly lower survival rates. This could hypothetically be attributed to a combination of the following factors:
• Injuries to the head are much more catastrophic due to the
vulnerability of the brain, and it being a much larger proportion of the “target area” (i.e., frontal profile of the face/head),
as opposed to the torso where the chances of hitting a vital
organ are proportionately lower.
• The material properties of polycarbonate offer less protection
compared to aramid (Kevlar) by volume and weight.
• The mechanism of failure of polycarbonate visors could
potentially be a “shattering” effect, which also enables more
kinetic energy to pass through into the victim causing more
catastrophic injury. By comparison, it could be argued that
aramid fabric is able to absorb and redistribute kinetic
energy more efficiently than polycarbonate.
• Both polycarbonate and aramids are subject to degradation
due to environmental factors such as UV light, moisture, and
general wear and tear. This would begin to degrade the protective performance of these materials over time. It could be
argued that polycarbonate could deteriorate at a faster rate
due to increased exposure to the elements when compared
to aramid fabric (which is usually contained within a waterresistant pouch).

Taking these factors into consideration, it must also be noted
that the relationship between the kinetic energy of a projectile and
the severity of injuries (e.g., traumatic bone and soft tissue damage) has been extensively documented in medical journals and
other publications. According to Rozen and Dudkiewicz’s chapter
“Wound Ballistics and Tissue Damage” in Armed Conflict Injuries
to the Extremities: A Treatment Manual:10
The amount of tissue damage and the injury
severity of gunshot injuries are due to the energy
transmitted by the bullets or projectiles,
depending mainly on their velocity. Therefore,
the injuries are not divided any more, as in the
past, to ‘high- and low-velocity injury’ but to
‘a high- or low-energy injury.

This understanding is further supported by Hauer et al.:

Although a large number of factors influence
the missile in flight and after penetration of the
body, the most important factor is the amount of
energy transmitted to the tissue. Shrapnel wounds
are usually produced with similarly high kinetic
energy to those caused by hand- and long guns.
However, fragments tend to dissipate the entire
amount of energy within the body, which increases
the degree of tissue disruption.11

One of the main mechanisms through which tissue damage is
achieved is through cavitation, in which a high-energy projectile
will cause large wound cavities as a result of energy transfer. This
is further exacerbated by internal lacerations, tumbling, and fragmentation of the projectile within the victim, as well as secondary fragmentation of bone causing additional injury. According to
Rozen and Dudkiewicz, these factors are “thought to be the most
significant factor in tissue injury from high energy projectiles.”12

Rudimentary Theoretical Model of Fragmentation Impact Energy
on PPE
The mechanics through which PPE is compromised may be a
combination of factors including impact kinetic energy (a function of velocity and mass), cross-sectional density, and hardness
of the projectile as well as impact and deflection angles. In order to
develop a simplified theoretical model to study the effects of fragmentation, this paper will limit these to two factors, namely the
kinetic energy of the incoming projectile and the kinetic energy
impact resistance rating of the typical PPE material. One can therefore develop a hypothesis that if the kinetic energy of the impact
exceeds the resistance rating of the PPE material, then the probability of penetration of the PPE material will be higher.13 For further simplification, this model will assume that there is no further
fragmentation of the projectile upon impact and the hypothetical
kinetic energy passed through to the victim would be the residual
kinetic energy after the impact (kinetic energy of the impact minus
the resistance rating), thereby representing an analogue for potential severity of injury.
IMAS 10.30 lists a minimum requirement for torso protection to
be STANAG V50450 at 1.102 g, which equates to 111.78 J of impact
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kinetic energy (kinetic energy = 1/2 m v 2 .14 As such, torso protection in the HMA sector is typically comprised of aramid fabrics
(Kevlar) providing soft armor to STANAG 2920 V50450 fragmentation protection. This standard is defined as body armor stopping a
series of projectiles being launched at 450 m/s at least 50 percent of
the time.15 Bolduc and Jager further define fragmentation types and
mass, with R7 being the highest mass “right angled, circular crosssection (RCC)” projectile.” Therefore, if a soft (aramid) body armor
type is rated V50450 R7, then it is rated to stop 50 percent of unsaboted, RCC projectiles with a maximum mass of 4.15 g travelling at
450 m/s, and the theoretical impact kinetic energy (in joules) of this
projectile would be 420.185 J. By comparison, the most common
form of facial protection in compliance with IMAS 10.30 are polycarbonate full face visors that are at least 5 mm thick. According to
the technical manual of one polycarbonate manufacturer, SABIC,
their 5 mm polycarbonate sheets are rated up to 370 J of impact.16
In order to compare the differences in kinetic energy impact
of a typical piece of primary fragmentation versus secondary
fragmentation, the following formulas will be used as the basis

for calculating the velocity (V) upon impact of the respective
projectiles.
The starting velocity of primary fragmentation from a metal
bodied ordnance is determined by the respective Gurney equation17 (see Figure 1), which takes into account the body shape of the
item (spherical or cylindrical) and the velocity of detonation of the
explosive charge (dependent on explosive type).
V = initial fragment
velocity (m/s)

Cylindrical Charge Equation

(V / √2E) = ((M / C exp) + 1/2))-1/2 √2E = Gurney Constant for a
given explosive (m/s)

Spherical Charge Equation

(V / √2E) = ((M / C exp) + 3/5))-1/2

M = mass of fragment (kg)
C exp = explosive charge mass

(kg)

Figure 1. Gurney equations for cylindrical and spherical bodies.
Figure courtesy of International Ammunition Technical Guidelines, 2015.

The initial velocity calculated from a respective Gurney equation
for cylindrical or spherical bodies can then be used to further calculate the estimated velocity of a piece of fragmentation (and thus
also the energy) at a determined range as a function of air density,
cross-sectional area, drag, and fragment mass.18 This is shown in
Figure 2.
V(s) = V0 * e-(p*Cd*A*S)/(2*m)

V(s) = velocity at desired distance
V0 = velocity of the fragment at the

point

p = atmospheric density (kg) = 1.2
kg/m3 at sea level.
Cd = drag coefficient (dependent on
fragment shape)
For reference, a perfect smooth
sphere has a Cd of 0.47 at subsonic
speeds and around 1.1 at supersonic speeds while a flat plate has
a Cd of 1.28 (NASA, 1993).19 The US
Department of Defense Explosives
Safety Board recommends using a
Cd of 1.28 as an average to model
fragmentation drag of any given item
(Department of Defense, 1975). 20
A = cross sectional area of projectile
(in square meters)

S = desired distance in meters
M = mass of projectile (in kg)
Figure 2. Function of fragment velocity over distance travelled.
Figure courtesy of Federation of American Scientists.

Separately, according to the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD),
the estimated approximate maximum range for secondary fragmentation is shown in Figures 3 and 4.
Rocks

Soil

29.2 / NEQ 0.4

12.5 / NEQ 0.4

Figure 3. Theoretical maximum range of projectile material type
per scale of NEQ.
Figure courtesy of U.S. Department of Defense, 1975. 21

Furthermore, simple estimates of theoretical maximum range
of fragmentation (primary and secondary) can be calculated using
the following function:
R = (V0 / g) * Sin 2θ

R = Range (m)
V0 = Initial Fragment Velocity (m/s)
g = Gravity (m/s2) (Earth gravity constant is
9.82 m/s)

θ = Launch Angle (Radians)
Figure 4. Function of fragmentation maximum theoretical range.
Figure courtesy of International Ammunition Technical Guidelines, 2015.

Using these functions, the following are illustrative examples of
fragmentation velocity and impact kinetic energy calculated for
comparisons between primary fragmentation from a BLU-26 submunition and secondary fragmentation from a PMN AP blast mine.
A BLU-26 cluster bomb has a body mass of 0.350 kg, a net
explosive quantity (NEQ) of 0.085 kg of Cyclotol, and an All Up
Weight (AUW)22 of 0.435 kg. It is generally spherical in shape
and holds 600 small steel balls of fragmentation embedded
within the metallic body. It has a diameter of 0.064 m (64 mm)
and a radius of 0.032 m. 23 Using these dimensions, the spherical
surface area of the item is 0.0128 m 2 (or 12,867 mm 2), and using
these specifications, it is possible to calculate the initial velocity
of the metal fragments at the point of detention with the spherical Gurney equation for Cyclotol as follows:
V = (((M / Cexp) + 3/5))-1/2) / √2E
V = (((0.35 / 0.085 + 0.6)) -1/2) / 2,402
V = 1,106 m/s
Although there are 600 tiny ball bearings contained within the
body, these balls are embedded in the metal itself. Therefore, we
will assume that these bits will fragment chaotically (some still
attached to the metal casting while others will be ejected cleanly).
With this in mind, we can assume that 300 spheroid pieces of fragmentation are released on average from the body, with an average
mass of 0.0011 kg (1.1 g). The average cross-sectional surface area
of each fragment will be assumed to be the overall spherical surface
area divided by 300, which gives us 0.00004 m 2 . Therefore, assuming that the item detonates 1 m away from the victim, it is possible
to calculate the estimated average velocity of each fragment at 1 m
away from the point of detonation (at sea level) using the formula
provided by the Federation of American Scientists shown here:
V(s) = V0 * e-(p*Cd*A*S)/(2*m)
V(1) = 1,106 * e-(1.2*1.28*0.00004*1)/(2*0.0011)
V(1) = 1,072.5 m/s
Thus, at 1 m from the point of detonation, the pieces of fragmentation will have an estimated velocity on average of 1,072 m/s at sea
level. Assuming that each projectile has a mass of 1.1 g, then the
kinetic energy upon impact can be estimated to be around 575 J
(0.5 * 0.0011 * 1072.52). The velocity and energy at every meter of
distance travelled can also be calculated and is shown in Figure 5.
Using this basic fragmentation model as the underlying assumption, it is estimated that during a BLU-26 accident at 1 m, a 1.1 g
fragment will impact with 575 J of kinetic energy. Assuming that 5
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mm of polycarbonate is resisBLU 26 fragment velocity over distance
BLU fragment energy over distance
tant against 370 J under per1,200
fect theoretical conditions of
1,000
impact, at least 205 J of energy
600
800
will still be retained by the
600
400
fragment once a polycarbonate
400
200
visor is comprised. Likewise,
200
assuming
that
STANAG
0
0
V50450 R7 vest can resist up to
420 J under perfect theoretical
Distance (m)
Distance (m)
conditions, the kinetic energy
Rock secondary fragmentation velocity over distance
Rock secondary energy over distance
that is retained by the fragment after a body armor vest
600
400
has been compromised would
400
be at least 155 J under perfect
200
200
conditions. Without PPE, the
0
0
victim would theoretically
suffer the impact of the entire
Distance
Distance (m)
575 J of kinetic energy from a
single fragment.
By comparison, one can also model the velocity of a 1 cm3 piece Figure 5. Graphs on the fragmentation emergency and velocity
of rock that has been ejected from a PMN blast with the following over distance.
Figure courtesy of the author.
assumptions:
1. A PMN mine has 240 g NEQ of TNT.
2. During the explosion, the entire PMN body is consumed,
Now that we have the initial velocity of the rock (calculated from
and therefore the pieces of plastic/Bakelite primary frag- theoretical maximum range), we can calculate the travelling velocmentation will be excluded.
ity at a given range. Given the assumption that the rock’s dimen3. According to Encyclopedia Britannica, 24 the average den- sions are a spheroid with a volume of 0.000001 m3, the radius (r)
sity of rock is 2.73 g per cm 3. For simplicity´s sake, we will of the spheroid rock is roughly 0.006203 m (using r = (3 * V / 4π)⅓,
assume that the volume of this rock is precisely 1 cm3 (or
calculated as 0.6203 * 0.0000011/3), and correspondingly its cross0.000001 m3) and is spheroid in shape.
sectional area, which will be the same as its circular area is 0.00012
4. The rock is launched at a 45-degree angle from the blast site.
m 2 (calculated as π*0.0062032). Using this cross-sectional area, we
A 45-degree launch angle achieves the maximum theoretical
can estimate the secondary fragmentation velocity at 0.6 m (as stiprange of any launched projectile.
Therefore, with an explosive weight of 0.24 kg of TNT in a PMN, ulated in IMAS) employing the Federation of American Scientists’
the maximum theoretical distance that a rock is ejected from a equation as follows:
V(s) = V0 * e-(p*Cd*A*S)/(2*m)
blast is (as per U.S. DOD 1975 formula):
V(0.6) = 507.47 * e-(1.2*1.28*0.00012*1)/(2*0.0027)
= 29.2 / NEQ 0.4
V(0.6) = 497 m/s
= 29.2 / 0.24 0.4
Therefore,
it is estimated that the rock will be travelling at a
= 51.67 m
Using the IATG simple fragment range estimation formula, it velocity of 497 m/s once it reaches 0.6 m (less than half the estiis possible to estimate the initial fragment velocity from a launch mated velocity of the BLU-26 fragment at 1 m). Using the 497 m/s
velocity at 0.6 m and the given mass of the rock being 2.7 g, the
angle of 45 degrees (0.785 radian).
estimated impact energy of the rock is calculated at 333.6 J (i.e., 0.5
If:
* (0.0027 * 4972)). This is within the 370 J impact rating of the 5 mm
51.67 = (V0 / g) * Sin 2θ
polycarbonate produced by SABIC and STANAG 2920 V50 450 R7
51.67 = (V0 / 9.82) * Sin (2 * 0.785)
limits
for impact energy of 420 J.
Then:
Figure
5 illustrates the velocity and impact energies of BLU-26
V0 = 51.67 * 9.82 / Sin (2*0.785)
primary fragmentation and secondary fragmentation from a PMN
V0 = 507.47 m/s
blast. In addition to PPE playing a significant factor in mitigating
the transfer of kinetic energy, the standoff distance plays a significant factor as well. Projectiles rapidly decelerate, thereby also losing impact kinetic energy in the process.

Material Degradation of PPE and Environmental Impact of Disposal
Taking these scenarios into consideration, one can argue that
the condition of the PPE can potentially affect its tensile strength,
thereby decreasing its ability to absorb kinetic energy and enabling
a higher probability of penetration by both primary and secondary fragmentation. The decreased level of protection offered by the
degraded material would in turn permit more kinetic energy to
pass through to the wearer. The degradation of both polycarbonate
and Kevlar due to use and environmental factors has been extensively documented.
In the case of polycarbonate, exposure to ultraviolet (UV)
light has been one of the main causes of material degradation.25
Significant yellowing occurs to the material and the polycarbonate loses its strength and elasticity. The mechanical properties of
polycarbonate also change, becoming more brittle and crystalline.
Under laboratory conditions, untreated polycarbonate begins to
yellow within seventy-two hours of UV exposure and significantly
yellows by 503 hours of UV exposure.26 Assuming that a polycarbonate visor is exposed to sunlight eight hours a day in field conditions, this would be the equivalent of 62.88 work days. Tensile
strength decreases by 9 percent within 216 hours of UV exposure.
This degradation means that polycarbonate visors lose their protective properties after continuous operational use, thereby gradually losing their ability to offer the level of protection specified in
IMAS 10.30.
During regular operational/field usage, visors also accumulate
scratches and other wear and tear, thereby further compromising
the structural integrity. Additionally, the combination of scratches
and yellowing of visors further adds to the diminishing of visibility
for the user. IMAS Technical Note 10.10/0227 states that
Users should be aware that the polycarbonate
material from which blast-visors are made
is adversely affected by prolonged exposure
to sunlight (UV light). The effect of sunlight is
to create hardened areas from which a
crack may propagate.

It further goes on to report instances where visors have shattered
as a result of AP mine blasts, exacerbating the injuries received by
victims. Even in cases where polycarbonate is only used in a relatively limited capacity such as in ROFI’s demining mask (the mask
is primarily made from laminated composite materials with a polycarbonate vision slot), the use of polycarbonate presents a potential
“single point failure” scenario.
A test of a new mask in 2008 by the Swedish Rescue Services
Agency conducted on 240 g of TNT equivalent placed on the surface on sand with a 70-degree blast angle at 55 cm showed that the
polycarbonate vision slot of the mask shattered while the rest of
the mask was not compromised during the blast.28 A similar test
done on 140 g of TNT equivalent showed both the polycarbonate
vision slot and the composite components of the mask withstanding the blast. According to ROFI, an internal test with the blast
of a PMA-1A (presumably containing the standard 200 g of TNT)

at 55 cm showed that the mask withstood the blast without being
compromised (ROFI).29
Aramid fabrics such as Kevlar used in body armor also suffer
from degradation due to continual use. In particular, degradation as a result of long-term exposure to moisture and mechanical
ablation from friction has been documented. According to Forster
et al., p-phenylene terephthalamides (PPTA) body armor such as
Kevlar and Twaron had a theoretical 10–13 percent decrease in V50
rating resistance after artificial aging simulating the temperature,
humidity, and mechanical wear of typical field use over five years. 30
Likewise, Grant et al. reported a 10 percent reduction in V50 ballistic performance of five-year-old, United States National Institute
of Justice (NIJ) Level IIIA and Level II body armor taken from a
random sample of field users. 31 Direct exposure of aramids such as
Kevlar and Twaron to the natural elements conducted in hot and
humid environments have reported up to an 80 percent decrease
in tensile strength.32 Possible explanations for this include water
and other liquid ingress causing the “slippage of yarns of aramid
fabric in wet conditions,”33 as well as mechanical wearing of the
fibers caused by repeated folding and rolling34 simulating conditions worn in the field.
As a result of degradation, body armor manufacturers typically provide a five-year warranty and it is recommended that
users replace the body armor every five years of regular use or
the period recommended by the manufacturer.35 IMAS Technical
Note 10.10/02 also recommends that “visors manufactured from
untreated polycarbonate are replaced annually or every 225 days of
use in order to minimise risks of degraded protection as a result of
UV exposure.”36 Taking this into consideration, environmentallysound methods of disposal employed by HMA operators may not
typically be available in countries that they work in.
Kevlar in its final form is very hard to destroy and will not
naturally decompose in a landfill. Although there exists various
energy and capital-intensive recycling methods such as chemical
and thermal breakdown (pyrolysis) of the materials, it is not yet at
a stage to be economically viable.37 Relatively new methods such as
thermal degradation, as proposed by Dabkiewicz et al., have yet to
be fully commercialized.38 Although there are various companies
that specialize in the recycling of Kevlar, these companies are not
present in many developing countries where mine action operators normally work. Shipping unserviceable Kevlar internationally
will also likely not be cost-effective, particularly for humanitarian
organizations.
As stated previously, visors have a relatively short service life and
polycarbonate material is not as easily recyclable as other plastics
such as polyethylene. Polycarbonate is typically recycled through
thermal and chemical processes that break down and reconstitute the material. As it is for recycling Kevlar, the processes for
recycling polycarbonate are not readily available in most of the
countries where HMA is being conducted due to its technical and

ISSUE 25.2 @ FALL-WINTER 2021

15

Male NPA deminers in South Sudan wearing
aramid body armor and polycarbonate visors.
capital-intensive nature. As a plastic polymer, polycarbonate does
not naturally bio-degrade in landfills and particulate shedding
can occur which can further add to microplastic pollution. For
example, Zhang et al., 39 estimate that 310 t of microplastic polycarbonate enter water systems annually in the form of sewage sludge
in the United States. Polycarbonate waste has been documented
to leach a precursor additive compound bisphenol A (BPA) into
water sources. Although longitudinal public health implications
have yet to be studied, evidence presented by Konieczna et al.,40
suggests a strong relationship between prolonged BPA exposure
and endocrine disorders in humans. According to Morin et al.,41
“BPA is commonly found in landfill leachate at levels exceeding
acute toxicity benchmarks” and in Norway it was reported that
concentrations of 188 mg +-125 mg of BPA leachate was present in
every 1 kg of solid plastic waste.42 To the author’s knowledge, there
have not yet been any definitive studies on the proportion of polycarbonate in overall global plastic waste and the extent to which
this has caused environmental damage in developing countries
(particularly mine and explosive remnants of war [ERW]-affected
countries) is unreported.
Taking all of this into consideration, HMA operators can potentially release several tonnes of polycarbonate and aramid waste
every few years due to the need for replacement of visors and body
armor. If for example a mine action operator deploys 1,000 deminers wearing full face polycarbonate visors and body armor in a
country program, then the operator may be expected to discard up
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to 1,000 visors every year if it complies to IMAS 10.10/02 recommendations and up to 1,000 kits of body armor every five years.
With a typical standard full-face visor from a manufacturer such
as Security Devices weighing around 1 kg and body armor (i.e.,
Apron) weighing between 2.5 and 3.9 kg,43 this would equate to
1 t of polycarbonate waste produced every year and 2.5–3.9 t of
aramid waste produced every five years by that operator’s country
program alone.
For perspective, NPA employs 1,441 mine action operational
staff globally as of September 2021. From anecdotal reports, mine
action operators typically put unserviceable PPE into long-term
storage, however it is not immediately clear what will happen
thereafter and what the end-of-life cycle process of this waste disposal will be. If for instance the items are discarded in local landfills, the environmental concerns as highlighted previously may be
particularly acute. Likewise, if the items are incinerated, there will
likely be significant carbon emissions and particulate air pollution.
There are also ethical concerns regarding the practice of international operators donating unserviceable or expired PPE to national
operators and national authorities, particularly if the materials
have degraded to such an extent as to offer decreased protection
below national standards and/or IMAS 10.30. It can also be the
case that operators may not know when and why PPE needs to be
replaced, thereby continuing the use of degraded or unserviceable
PPE in the field and adding unnecessary risks.

Gendered Perspectives on Comfort and Ergonomics
While the technical drawbacks and limitations in the appropriateness, use, and disposal of PPE have been explored throughout
this paper, it is also important to factor in the comfort level of PPE
for the wearer, to further enable a safer and more productive work
environment. As stated previously, although there are commercially available products that can provide increased protection, this
comes at a significant penalty in weight, bulk, and discomfort for
the wearer (not considering cost). Although there have been technological developments in body armor such as the increased use of
ultra-high molecular weight polyethylene (UHMWPE) and innovative facial protection systems that use composite materials combined with reduced use of polycarbonate such as ROFI’s demining
masks, widespread adoption has been relatively limited.
Furthermore, just as threats and protective technologies change
over time, so too has the face of mine action. Whereas in the past,
mine action operations (particularly demining and EOD) have
been almost exclusively conducted by men, there is now greater
participation of women both as operational staff and as leaders.
According to IMAS 10.30, “PPE provided shall fit the employee,
male or female, and be designed to provide reasonable comfort
and protection against the predictable risks present at a demining worksite. Cultural practices should also be taken into consideration.”44 Unfortunately, almost all PPE used in the HMA sector
is unisex and not optimized toward female wearers. This causes

discomfort and potentially reduces the safety of the equipment
and the wearer’s operational efficiency. Although female-specific
body armor is now commonly used in the law enforcement sector
around the world, these developments have not yet been adopted
within the mine action sector. Unisex body armors are typically
designed according to the size, body shape, and/or proportions of
men; however, when issued to women, the only difference is that
they are issued in smaller sizes.
For this reason, the author hypothesizes that the current generation of PPE may not provide the full coverage, comfort, or functionality for women when compared to men. One of the first activities
encompassed in the Innovation Norway grant is to develop and
field next generation PPE. With this in mind, NPA conducted an
internal global survey of 340 participants working in field operations; 65.6 percent of whom were women. In total, 83.8 percent of
respondents worked as a deminer or team leader. Highlights from
the preliminary results showed that:
•
•

•

•
•

•

•
•

•
•
•

13.53 percent of respondents reported their body armor
as being overall uncomfortable or very uncomfortable
25 percent of respondents reported some form of
abdominal pain or discomfort while wearing body
armor
25.89 percent of respondents reported reported their
visors as being overall uncomfortable or very uncomfortable
25.89 percent of respondents reported some form of hip
pain or discomfort while wearing body armor
26.47 percent of respondents reported some form of
genital/groin pain or discomfort while wearing body
armor
27.36 percent of respondents reported some form of
inner thigh pain or discomfort while wearing body
armor
27.65 percent of respondents reported some form of
breast pain or discomfort while wearing body armor
34.11 percent of respondents reported some form of
lower back pain or discomfort while wearing body
armor
39.70 percent of respondents reported some form of difficulty breathing while wearing visors
41.76 percent of respondents reported some form of
shoulder pain or discomfort while wearing body armor
48.23 percent of respondents had some form of head or
neck pain while wearing visors

Female NPA deminer in Tajikistan
conducting clearance in difficult
terrain while wearing aramid body
armor and a demining mask.

These preliminary results appear to be consistent with the initial assumption that improvements in ergonomics are necessary,
particularly as it relates to women. In addition to the various cultural taboos in developing and post-conflict countries for women
in what was traditionally seen as male-dominated work, the lack
of ergonomic optimization of PPE for women may also be a factor
in creating further barriers to female participation in the mine
action sector.

ISSUE 25.2 @ FALL-WINTER 2021

17

Conclusion and Prospective Innovations
Through analysis of casualties from high-velocity fragmentation, analyzing the kinetic energy impact of fragmentation, and
conducting a literature review on the degradation of polycarbonate
and aramids, the existing evidence appears to suggest that any new
developments in PPE should minimize or completely forego the
use of polycarbonate for visors, and at the very least pursue ways
to better seal aramid materials against the elements. This would
enable more consistent levels of IMAS 10.30 compliant V50 450
protection of both body armor and visors. Further exploration
is also needed on finding ways to improve protection beyond the
level stipulated in IMAS 10.30, particularly against high-velocity
fragmentation, without increasing weight and bulk or reducing
visibility. Careful consideration will also be needed to ensure the
environmentally sustainable disposal of expired or unserviceable
PPE and/or ways to prolong the service life of existing serviceable
stocks. As of this writing, NPA is conducting further studies to
determine the life-cycle management of PPE in its country programs. Underlying all of this is the cross-cutting theme that any
development and advancement in PPE must be gender-sensitive
and take into account user feedback on comfort, mobility, and
visibility, particularly from female users. It must also be noted,
as argued by Smith, that cost will always be a factor in enabling
widespread adoption, therefore any new solutions proposed must
be cost-effective and on par with the cost of replenishing current
generation PPE.
In support of these conclusions, NPA will be pursuing the following lines of inquiry:
• Explore the incorporation of composite materials and new
designs of visors that minimize the use of polycarbonate.
Transparent materials in lieu of polycarbonate, treatments
of polycarbonate, or a combination thereof will be also
explored. One of the possibilities is to further optimize the
demining mask design (or similar designs) to enable better

visibility, breathability, and protection at a cost on par with
untreated polycarbonate visors.
• Explore portable low-cost solutions that can enable the safe
destruction or recycling of unserviceable polycarbonate and
aramids with the least environmental impact. These solutions must be implementable in austere environments.
• Explore the use of ballistic fabrics that are more environmentally and mechanically resistant to wear and tear than
aramid, develop better protective shells for current aramid
PPE in service, and/or explore composite designs that offer
the same levels of mobility and flexibility of aramid.
• Conduct focus groups on how to best optimize and modularize PPE designs so that they can be more adaptable to female
users.
NPA will subsequently be having a market dialogue wherein an
open invitation will be announced for all companies and organizations interested in partnering with NPA under this Innovation
Norway project in order to find potential solutions and jointly
develop and field test scalable prototypes.
See endnotes page 70

Kyaw Lin Htut
Advisor/Desk Officer
Mine Action and Disarmament
Norwegian People’s Aid
Kyaw Lin Htut is a Desk Officer for
Norwegian People’s Aid, Department of
Mine Action and Disarmament. He previously served in various mine action operational and management roles in Southeast Asia and the
Caucasus. As Desk Officer, he oversees a portfolio of country
programs in Southeast Asia and the Pacific and also manages
NPA’s projects with Innovation Norway. He is IMAS EOD Level
3 qualified and holds a master’s degree in economics.

Female NPA deminers in Tajikistan wearing aramid body armor and demining masks.
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A Call to Action

By Lillian Gates [ Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs,
U.S. Department of State ]

E

ffective accident response in humanitarian mine action (HMA) contributes to increased safety
in future demining work. Mine action organizations play a variety of roles in the improvement
of accident response, with the U.S. Department of State’s Office of Weapons Removal and
Abatement in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA) being the most recent to adjust their
accident response process by establishing the Accident Review Panel (ARP). This panel consolidates
the office’s efforts and allows for standardized accident response protocol and the collection and analysis of accident data. Other organizations active in cultivating better accident responses include the
United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), The HALO Trust (HALO), Geneva International Centre
for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), private accident specialists such as Andy Smith and his Database
of Demining Accidents (DDAS), and other mine action actors. Accident response continues to improve
as organizations focus on best practices such as accident preparedness, conducting quality investigations and reports, and promoting a culture of openness when sharing lessons learned. Through
continuous dedication to best practices in accident response, the HMA community may see improved
safety in future projects and demining endeavors.
Although members of the HMA community employ an array
of safety protocols to mitigate risk, the unfortunate reality is that
accidents happen. Effective accident response is key to learning
from mistakes and enhancing the safety of future demining projects. PM/WRA recently launched an initiative designed to take
steps towards improved accident management. The newly established ARP will standardize PM/WRA’s response to accidents happening within the office’s grant-funded projects, as well as enable

the office to store and track trends in accident data over time.
This approach is one of many ways that the HMA community is
responding to accidents. Accident response continues to improve,
especially with a greater focus on preparedness, quality investigations and response, and the promotion of a culture of openness.
This technical report surveys the current state of accident reporting and concludes with potential best practices and improvements
for future accident management.

IMAS
One of the most well-known guides for accident response is the
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). IMAS 10.60 was
first published in 2001 and has most recently been updated in the
2020 revised second edition titled, “Safety & occupational health –
Investigation and reporting of accidents and incidents.”1 The IMAS
Review Board—under the leadership of UNMAS, with secretariat
support from the GICHD and comprised of over twenty national
representatives, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other
entities—must reach consensus among the many stakeholder perspectives. As a result, the standards reflect a baseline level of compliance but provide a plethora of elective recommendations for ideal
accident response. Most members of the HMA community follow
IMAS guidance and recommendations.

This newest iteration of IMAS 10.60 streamlines the postaccident process into two stages: an immediate report completed
within twenty-four hours of the accident or incident, followed by
a detailed investigation and final report completed as quickly as
possible. The revised second edition also places a heavy emphasis
on gathering evidence through interviews, physical examination,
etc., as well as conducting investigations that are “clear, comprehensive, evidence-based, and timely” to “reduce the likelihood of
harm to the lowest practicable level.”2 During the reporting process, investigators are encouraged to conduct a causal analysis to
identify potential causes of accidents that could inform remedial
actions. IMAS 10.60 also promotes unbiased investigating/reporting and suggests practices of peer review, extensive evidence
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gathering, and detailed recordkeeping throughout the entire accident reporting process. 3 These standards provide guidance for

how accident responses should be conducted and set the precedent
for many in the HMA community.

The Department of State
In 2021, PM/WRA introduced the ARP as a new method for If insufficient, the panel can draft suggestions for the implementing
accident reporting management. Before the ARP was established, organization.
accidents occurring within U.S.-funded projects were managed by
The ARP has been established to emphasize the United States’
PM/WRA’s respective grant officers and program managers. The commitment to the safety of all demining personnel on U.S.-funded
implementing partners would notify the office of accidents and projects. To ensure an environment of openness, Tirre emphasized
submit a formal report on the event. In contrast to the now central- that the panel’s goal is not to carry out punishments or conduct
ized system, individual grant officers would maintain jurisdiction independent PM/WRA investigations of incidents, but to promote
over the accident reports and remedial actions deemed appropriate a culture of safety and cooperation. Should remedial action be
for each situation. ARP chair Michael Tirre, a program manager in necessary, the panel can suggest potential corrective actions to the
PM/WRA, expressed that this traditional “one-off” process made grant manager. The ARP will also contribute to international mine
it difficult to ensure a standardized approach to cataloging and action literature. Tirre stated that the ARP will consolidate cases
responding to accidents on U.S.-funded awards. It also limited PM/ the panel reviews and potentially could share general information
WRA’s ability to identify trends over time.
on any trends observed with the greater mine action community
In 2020, PM/WRA received an unusually high number of dem- that could contribute to more effective preventative training and
ining accident reports, underscoring the importance of address- education for deminers, and ultimately fewer accidents.5
ing accidents in the field. Responding to this concern, in 2020
the office established the Safety and Accountability Working
Group to improve safety with implementing partners. The
working group identified the need for a more permanent
Accident &
and standardized response to accidents. As a result, the ARP
Initial Response
was established in the spring/summer of 2021 as a standing
panel ready to convene in response to accident reports. Tirre
explained that the panel seeks to better report and respond
Improved Safety
Full Investigation
to accidents as well as identify trends that can inform future
Standards
& Report
demining practices. Comprised of ten members, the panel
will grow to include grant officers and volunteers from PM/
WRA’s regional teams, and ultimately may include representatives from partner U.S. government agency offices.4
A new protocol for reviewing and responding to accident
reports was delineated as well. When an accident report is
Lessons Learned Remedial Actions
submitted, the panel will convene, evaluate, and decide on
Disseminated
Implemented
a response. The evaluation phase begins with an assessment
of the information presented to determine if it is sufficiently
detailed. The panel will then decide if the terms and conditions of the grant were violated during the accident. After identi- Figure 1. Cycle of accident response and
fying any terms and conditions violated, an analysis will assess if improved safety.
the proposed remedial actions are adequate to prevent recurrence. Figure courtesy of the author/Johns Hopkins University.

The HALO Trust
HALO has a well-developed accident response protocol. Project
teams run accident casualty drills monthly in preparation for a
potential accident. When an accident occurs, project managers
in the field handle immediate triage including sending any victims to the hospital and notifying headquarters. Other projects in
that country are often paused to avoid the risk of two accidents
happening simultaneously, especially if the initial accident is due
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to a process error. Once the initial response is complete, project
managers are responsible for collecting evidence and interviewing individuals involved as soon as possible to gain the most accurate information about the event. Internal investigations are then
carried out alongside the national authority’s investigations. If
there is no national authority represented, a third-party investigation team may be organized and include HALO employees from

other projects/headquarters, accident specialists, and representatives from other demining NGOs. These investigation teams aim
to include both unbiased representatives and those familiar with
HALO procedures. Once investigations are complete—this process
may take a few days to a few months depending on the availability of investigation teams—the report is reviewed, and remedial
actions are enacted. Adam Jasinski, Director of Capability at
HALO, emphasized that the most important part of the accident

response process is implementing and following up on modifications recommended by the investigation, and that organizations
should never assume the changes will happen smoothly. If the
investigations reveal issues that go beyond organization-specific
protocols, HALO will voluntarily share the reports with national
authorities and other NGOs. This openness in the HMA community is reciprocated by other NGOs.

Before and after images of a visor involved in an accident in Tajikistan.
Images courtesy of Andy Smith/DDAS/CISR.

Institutions and Specialists
The GICHD provides resources for accident response as part of
its mission to “develop and professionalise the sector” to reduce
risk. GICHD-written articles published in this Journal report on
best practices for reducing risk in various demining situations.6
The organization also provides professional training courses
including the “Accident Investigation Course,” which teaches field
staff the fundamentals of accident investigation.7 In an effort to
inspire changes in work practice and improve demining equipment, GICHD launched the MACRA database: an online central
repository of accidents, incidents, and near misses.8 Input to this
database is provided by members of the GICHD Central Repository
Working Group comprised of representatives from various HMA
organizations. Data is categorized according to location of the
incident, injury, explosive ordnance type, etc., without disclosing
sensitive information such as names of persons involved. To date,
MACRA contains over 1,500 accident reports.9
The DDAS is an independent accident report database of over
800 accident reports collected and made available by Andy Smith,

a humanitarian mine action specialist who has worked for governments, the United Nations, NGOs, and commercial organizations
at all levels.10 He served for ten years on the IMAS Review Board
as an independent specialist on personal protective equipment
(PPE) and injury prevention. Smith takes care to analyze the accident reports gathered by/submitted to him and incorporate them
into trainings and consultations he provides to the HMA community. The DDAS is now housed in the Humanitarian Demining
Accident and Incident Database (AID) in the Global Conventional
Weapons Destruction (CWD) Repository managed by the Center
for International Stabilization and Recovery (CISR).11 CISR contributes to improving accident responses by also publishing relevant articles in The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction
(JCWD), such as issue 24.2, which featured Roly Evans’ “Notes on
the Revised Second Edition” of IMAS 10.60.12 These actors provide the HMA community with resources that can improve safety
through high-quality accident management.
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Best Practices and Potential Improvements
Conversations with members of the HMA sector indicate that the
community is dedicated to promoting safety through high-quality
accident response. A few common themes emerge as potential best
practices going forward: preparedness, quality investigations and
response, and cultivating a culture of openness. These best practices may be relevant as the HMA community seeks to continue
improving safety through accident response.
Preparedness. Being prepared can be one of the most important
steps in effective accident response management. Preparedness
begins with training field staff in proper safety techniques and
enforcing these practices regularly. HALO’s regular accident training sets a good example to follow. Staff may also benefit from programs such as GICHD’s Accident Investigation Course that trains
staff in proper accident response including immediate damage
control, how to collect evidence and testimonies from witnesses,
and how to carry out investigations and write reports if an investigation team is not available. If/when an accident does occur, prescribing and enforcing remedial actions could prepare field staff
to avoid similar accidents in the future, as emphasized by Adam
Jaskinski of HALO.
Quality Investigations and Response. The quality of an accident investigation can affect the accuracy and effectiveness of prescribed remedial actions. IMAS 10.60 stresses the importance of
evidence-based investigations, suggesting that improvements in
evidence gathering could significantly improve investigations and
reports. These investigations may also benefit from multiple perspectives on a situation and newly adopted technology like LiDAR
and unmanned aerial systems (UAS). Through neutral and/or
diverse investigation teams, investigations can overcome cognitive
bias, a phenomenon where individual perspectives are limited by

unintentional bias. Once evidence is gathered, Andy Smith emphasized the importance of asking “why” an accident occurred and
anticipating that there may be multiple reasons. This causal analysis can provide insights into which remedial actions could be most
helpful in preventing similar accidents in the future. Once these
remedial actions are implemented, Jasinski’s advice is to expect the
changes to take time and require regular enforcement.
Culture of Openness. Emphasizing a culture of openness may
result in a safer HMA community. Members of the HMA community are in general agreement that subpar accident reporting is not
the result of intentionally devaluing safety. Instead, the quality of
reports may decline as other values such as fear of retribution take
precedence over safety. At the individual level, prioritizing safety
may encourage field staff to report accidents and near misses in
detail rather than keeping quiet for fear of retribution. This would
allow for greater detail in evidence gathering and ultimately more
accurate investigations and reports. In an environment where
safety takes precedence over competition, organizations can prioritize operational risk management over organizational risk management by engaging in honest reporting and the sharing of lessons
learned publicly. National actors and donors are also able to promote openness by encouraging safe practices and effective reporting through legislation and grant contracts. Encouraging a culture
of openness may also improve the information available publicly
about accident trends over time. Looking to the future, increased
use of databases like the MACRA and the AID/DDAS could enable
unbiased analysis of accident trends and provide the HMA community with greater understanding of the causes of accidents and
how to avoid them.
See endnotes page 70

Call to Action
In its commitment to enhancing safety, the HMA community
recognizes the importance of effective accident response. While
risk will never be completely eradicated, continually improving
accident investigations and reporting can improve safety in the
field. PM/WRA’s ARP is the latest example of how the HMA community is dedicating more resources to this critical need. Broad
and sustained commitment to preparedness, quality investigations
and reporting, and a culture of openness is key to reducing accidents and enhancing safety going forward.
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CLIMATE CHANGE
AND EXTREME WEATHER:
How Can Mine Action
Programs Adapt to Our
Changing Environment?
By Linsey Cottrell [ Conflict and Environment Observatory ] and
Carlie Stowe [ PeaceTrees Vietnam ]

E

xtreme weather events around the world are already impacting land that is contaminated with
explosive ordnance (EO). Chronicling these events is not yet standardized, but these events will
become more frequent as our climate changes. The uncertainty around climate change, related
risks, and how these will regionally impact mine action operations makes it difficult to prioritize and
plan for mitigation and adaptation measures. With limited guidance currently in place for the mine
action sector, the introduction of climate change adaptation principles must be supported, and operational and risk management plans must be scrutinized to ensure that any additional climate change–
related risks can be effectively managed. This would have the potential to reduce future impacts on
operations, improve the efficacy of current work, and help build climate resilience for EO-affected
communities.
Climate change refers to a long-term and large-scale shift in
global weather patterns and average temperatures.1 The Paris
Agreement on climate change is a legally binding international
treaty aiming to keep the increase in global average temperatures to below 2 degrees Celsuis. Climate scientists agree that
the global and regional effects of climate change due to human
activity are already a reality.2 In August 2021, the report by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change starkly warned of
increasingly extreme heatwaves, droughts, and flooding, and that
the role of human influence in the climate system is undisputed.3
Global temperatures have risen by an average 1.1 degrees Celsius
since the nineteenth century and continue to rise.
The effects of climate change are wide-ranging. The effects
vary depending on location, and can lead to more intense rainfall, increased risk of flooding and landslides, more frequent and
intense dry spells, higher average temperatures, increased risk of
wildfires, warming oceans, sea-level rise, and permafrost thawing.
The impact of these events on humans is becoming evident, with
more extreme weather linked to forced displacement, migration,
and food insecurity, particularly in low-income countries.
Planning for adverse weather and environmental conditions
already forms part of operational and risk management plans for

mine action programs. The likelihood of more frequent, more
intense, and less predictable extreme weather events due to climate
change means that these plans must be scrutinized to ensure that
any additional climate change-related risks can be effectively managed, so that operating capacity and the safety of field staff is not
compromised.
The link between climate change and mine action operations
may vary, as each region will be impacted in different ways. Climate
change impact will also depend on any coping mechanisms already
in place within programs. Many conflict-affected countries are
located in areas considered among the most vulnerable to the
effects of climate change, and are less prepared to adapt and less
resilient to the impacts.
Climate adaptation refers to altering the way we live, work, or
behave to reduce vulnerability to the inevitable impacts of climate
change due to past and on-going greenhouse gas emissions. Land
use and land management—key in mine clearance operations and
the release of land following clearance—play an important role to
mitigate and adapt to climate change. Soil erosion caused by the
removal of vegetation, flooding, or the use of heavy machinery can
reduce agricultural productivity and increase carbon losses from
soil to the atmosphere. Soil is the largest terrestrial store of organic
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carbon.4 This means that as well as maintaining good environmental practices during mine clearance operations, there must be better planning of post-clearance land use as part of humanitarian

mine action (HMA) programs. This will help ensure that land is
used sustainably and support is given to communities to adopt
appropriate climate adaptation and mitigation measures.

Affected Regions and Impacts
provinces experiencing severe f looding in recent
years. Climate change projections estimate
increased rainfall variability and intensity for
parts of Angola, which increase the likelihood of
extreme f looding events. 10, 11
Flooding or landslides causing the movement of
mines can also result in complex transboundary
issues. In 2021, the Lebanon army reported that
f loodwaters had caused mines located along the
Lebanese-Syrian border to migrate into Lebanese
territory.12 This makes clearance problematic due
to uncertainty around location, distribution, and
condition. This is in addition to political and territorial responsibility for clearance activities.
Tajikistan’s National Mine Action Strategy 2017202013 also recognizes that “[a]s a result of natural disasters, it is possible that some minefields or
Heavy deforestation across the Eastern Forest Complex of Afghanistan individual mines have moved to the territory of the
increases soil erosion and reduces soil productivity, which can be
Republic of Tajikistan, although, at the moment,
exacerbated by climate change.
their exact location and area are not known.”
Image courtesy of Ayub Alavi.
The increased risk of wildfires due to higher
Extreme weather events around the world are already impact- temperatures and longer dry seasons will mean additional risks
ing land that is contaminated with EO. Chronicling these events to communities in EO-contaminated areas and will hamper
is not yet standardized, but these events will become more fre- mine action programs. In Ukraine, firefighting and evacuation
quent as our climate changes. The impact of severe f looding on measures were even more challenging during the 2020 wildfires
mine action in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia has due to the presence of landmines.14
already been well-documented.5 Climate change variables can
Climate change also drives the movement and resettlement of
inf luence EO survey and clearance activities across different people. As communities move, this may mean that areas prioriregions, leading to increased risks to communities and the need tized for survey and clearance will need to be reassessed given
to adapt operations.
the increased pressures on land use. Additionally, people may be
Many EO-contaminated regions are also experiencing the exposed to different levels of risk as they move to new areas withcombined effects of climate change and high rates of deforesta- out historical knowledge of conf lict and contamination. This
tion. Tree cover and forests provide multiple environmental and could require a modified approach to EO risk education (EORE).
climate change mitigation benefits. For example, in the east of Additionally, people with no historic knowledge of conf lict and
Afghanistan, between 50 and 80 percent of tree cover was lost contamination moving into areas may also be exposed to differbetween 1977 and 2002.6 In 2019, just 1.5 percent of Afghanistan ent levels of risk, requiring a modified approach to EORE.
was estimated as forest or woodland.7 The severity of f looding
The selection and use of equipment for mine clearance operaimpacts in Afghanistan during 2020 has been attributed to the tions will also be affected by climate change. Mine detection
significant loss of tree cover.8 Heavy rainfall on bare or sparsely dogs (MDDs) for example are unable to work in wet conditions
vegetated slopes can cause f lash f looding since the ground has and some detection equipment (such as pulse induction detecminimal capacity to retain water runoff.
tors) has lower performance in high humidity.
Across Angola, the full impact of climate change on
Although rare, munitions stockpile explosions are also linked
EO-contaminated areas is unclear, although there are docu- to hot weather. Munitions are designed to withstand intense
mented reports of mines being washed up with f loodwater.9 heat in the short term, but prolonged high temperatures and
Seventeen out of the eighteen provinces across Angola are humidity can destabilize them, weaken their structural integcontaminated or suspected as contaminated with EO, with all rity, damage seals, and increase the risk of explosion. In 2018,
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Figure 1. Graph shows an overall increase in annual maximum temperatures for Quảng Trị, 1981–2020.
Figure courtesy of Earth Map and the ERA5 European Centre For Medium-Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF).
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Figure 2. Graph shows an overall increase in annual rainfall for Quảng Trị, 1981–2020.
Figure courtesy of Earth Map and Climate Hazards Group.

the unplanned explosion at a munition site in Baharka, Iraqi
Kurdistan, took place during scorching summer temperatures,
which is not a unique event during Iraq’s summer.15 Storm surges
and warmer sea temperatures due to climate change may also

significantly increase risks to people and marine life from the
legacy of marine-dumped ordnance, and will require specific
assessment and management. This includes the potential risks
from hazardous chemicals leaching from corroded ordnance.16

Vietnam Case Study
Increased Risks Due to Climate Change

Vietnam faces high disaster risk levels driven by elevated exposure to flooding (riverine, flash, and coastal), tropical storms, and
storm surges.17 The country is predicted to be one of the top five
countries most impacted by climate change,18 presenting complex challenges to the population and the economic growth of
the country. River flooding alone is estimated to impact on average 930,000 people per year in Vietnam and causes approximately

US$2.6 billion in annual economic losses.19 It is estimated that by
2030, these numbers will increase to 1,363,000 people affected and
US$6.2 billion in economic losses, respectively.20 With coastline
stretching the length of the country, without proper mitigation and
adaptation efforts, it is estimated that 12 million people will be permanently impacted by inundation.21
The United States dropped 413,130 tons of submunitions
over Vietnam between 1965 and 1973, reportedly striking 55
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PeaceTrees Vietnam removing 500 lb MK82 air-dropped bombs in Huong Hoa District, Quảng
Trị, which were exposed following the October 2020 storms.
Images courtesy of PeaceTrees Vietnam.

provinces and cities. Landmines along the border between China
and Cambodia laid during conflicts in the 1970s also remain. An
impact survey released by the government of Vietnam in 2018 estimated that 19 percent of Vietnam’s land surface remained affected
by EO.22 Quảng Trị Province is considered one of the most heavily
contaminated provinces in the country. Only around 28 percent of
the currently established confirmed hazardous areas (CHA) in the
province have been cleared.
Currently the Provincial Military Command’s explosive ordnance
disposal (EOD) teams, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), Norwegian
People’s Aid (NPA), and PeaceTrees Vietnam (PTVN) operate in the
province. The Quảng Trị Mine Action Centre (QTMAC) is responsible for the coordination of mine action activities in the province,
including task prioritization: MAG focuses primarily on clearance
with an additional team for survey; NPA focuses on cluster munition remnants surveys (including non-technical [NTS] and technical survey [TS]), clearance, and capacity development; and PTVN
undertakes clearance operations in the province.
Climate Trends and Recent Incidents

Open-source data for Quảng Trị Province on maximum annual
temperatures and annual rainfall indicate overall increases over
the last four decades (see Figures 1 and 2). Quảng Trị Province is
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mountainous and heavily reliant upon agriculture. The province
is already experiencing the impacts of climate change through
unpredictable precipitation patterns, higher maximum temperatures, and increasingly disastrous typhoon seasons. In October
and November 2020, eleven provinces in central Vietnam, including Quảng Trị, were hit by a series of tropical monsoons, depressions, and other uncharacteristically adverse weather patterns
directly impacting an estimated 1.5 million people, and causing an
estimated US$1.3 billion of damage in the six worst hit provinces.23
These storms, reported to have been the worst in over a century,
forced 15,372 households in Quảng Trị to evacuate.
Mine action operations in the province were also impacted, with
both NPA and PTVN reporting having to pause field operations
for up to four weeks, as well as having staff directly impacted by
the flooding and landslides, further delaying their ability to return
to work.
Phạm Hoàng Hà, country director of PTVN, reported that the
storms continue to have a lasting impact on operations. In the
immediate aftermath of the storm, PTVN was tasked with responding to ten large air-dropped bombs (including six MK82 500 lb and
one MK83 1000 lb bombs), exposed as a result of the flooding and
landslides. NPA was also tasked to respond to a MK82 500 lb bomb

that was exposed by the flooding. In some cases, flooding and the
washing away of topsoil can also have an operational impact on
EO clearance. Kimberley McCosker, project manager for NPA
Vietnam, explained that it can expose items otherwise well below
the national clearance depth and therefore beyond what would
routinely be searched. However, the risk of displaced EO contaminating additional areas of land remains, although there is no evidence that this has yet taken place in the province.
Plans for the Future

Both PTVN and NPA have begun to consider how mine action
operators can tackle the challenges posed to operations by climate
change. PTVN already works closely with communities to support their socioeconomic development needs and capacities after
land clearance has been conducted. Recently, PTVN conducted
land clearance for well projects in communities that are experiencing water shortages in the central highlands of Quảng Trị
Province. NPA has dedicated an Environmental Protection Officer
for their program in Vietnam and will be collecting environmental data as part of their community liaison (CL) and NTS process.
Additionally, NPA is exploring how environmental and climate
change education can be incorporated into their EORE programs.

Mine Action Standards, Strategies, and Guidance

International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) are intended to
guide development of national mine action standards (NMAS) and
standard operating procedures. Although they partially incorporate the need to consider weather and risks from other natural hazards, 24 there is currently no specific reference to the increased risks
due to climate change and how this should be addressed.
IMAS 07.13 (Environmental Management), 25 IMAS 07.14 (Risk
Management), 26 and IMAS 08.10 (Non-Technical Survey)27 could
potentially be updated to include guidance on the assessment and
management of climate change impacts. IMAS 07.13 primarily
addresses the mine action sector’s responsibility to prevent and
mitigate possible adverse impacts on the environment caused by
field operations. However, IMAS 07.13 does not yet consider how
environmental hazards—due to climate change—will impact mine
action operations or what measures should be considered to reduce
the effects of climate change on vulnerable communities once land
has been cleared and released.
IMAS 07.14 is designed to ensure the effective management and
reduction of risks relating to mine action operations, critically
requiring risk management systems to adapt quickly to changing
internal and external circumstances. Early accounting for climate
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change risks would help mine action organizations to better allocate resources and prioritize
operations, thereby avoiding other incurred costs
or the duplication of work. Residual risk management practices and plans should also consider
the implications of future climate change–related
hazards, the impact this might have for the
recontamination of previously cleared land, and
the risk of exacerbating climate change impacts
due to the intended future use of land once it has
been released.
IMAS 08.10 sets out guidance for NTS and the
collection of data on the physical environment,
which is relevant for supporting prioritization
planning and developing work plans. As a minimum, NTS should collect information on previous
Figure 3. Mapping of CHAs and satellite-detected surface water followadverse weather events and environmental hazards
ing the October 2020 storms across Quảng Trị Province.
as reported by local communities, environmental
Figure courtesy of Sentinel-1 image, 29 October 2020, 05:43 local time, UNITAR
NGOs, or local authorities to improve prioritiza- and PTVN.
tion strategies and preparedness measures.
While IMAS and technical guidance are
The development of a NMAS on environmental management in
important for steering best practices for mine action organiza- Cambodia, in accordance with their National Mine Action Strategy
tions, national mine action authorities (NMAA) or mine action 2018–2025, 28 highlights operational challenges and unpredictabiloperators can act by reviewing and updating current practices and ity due to climate change. Challenges are also described in the
operating procedures. Incorporating climate change-related haz- National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2016-2020 for Afghanistan,
ards and risk management into national mine action strategies and including the effects from melting snow on steep slopes, flooding,
NMAS should be a priority. Since there is no central database of and landslides.29 Vietnam is also developing a new NMAS, which
national strategies or NMAS, it is difficult to determine the current is set to include consideration of climate change-related risks in
gaps. However, steps are being taken by some.
TS operations.

Predicting And Planning for Change
Dealing With Uncertainty

The uncertainty around climate change-related risks and how
these will regionally impact mine action operations makes it difficult to prioritize and plan for mitigation measures. This uncertainty presents key challenges for HMA organizations, including
how to measure the vulnerability of operating systems, levels of
exposure, and costs associated with risk management strategies. 30
Achieving efficient and effective climate change risk management
requires all stakeholders to have an understanding of the multiplicity of uncertainties presented and for these uncertainties to be
fully considered. 31
In many countries, detailed climate modelling is absent or
incomplete. Due to the complexities of weather patterns, reasonable climate change projections and potential hazards are often difficult to predict. Data on historical weather patterns and improved
awareness of local climate trends could support planning, but this
may be challenging for international organizations working in varied contexts. Collecting this data during NTS could be a simplified,
first step to address this problem. This would help identify current
exposure and vulnerability but not necessarily future exposure.
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Further, participatory approaches to the prioritization of land
clearance could address some uncertainty on climate changerelated hazards and risks, by engaging with local communities—
especially those most marginalized (including women, children,
and people with disabilities)—local authorities, partners, and
organizations working on climate and disaster preparedness.
Mapping Vulnerable Areas

Using existing data on climate change–related hazards and their
relationship with mine action programs is an important tool to
raise awareness across affected communities and the mine action
sector. An example of a simple measure is given in Figure 3, where
open-source satellite data and detected surface water following the
tropical storms across Quàng Trị Province has been overlaid onto
maps showing CHAs for EO. Although this gives just a snapshot
in time, Figure 3 shows where flood water has impacted CHAs.
Combined with elevation data and an understanding of where surface water has and will flow, it could alert communities to potential
risks, as well as inform programming and work plan decisions.

Tree cover loss 2000–2020
Tree cover loss and gain

10

water runoff and the increased risk of slope failures
and landslides—and the importance of aligning
post-clearance land use with sustainable practices.

Tree cover gain 2000–2012
% Tree cover 2000

% Tree cover 2000

100

Lessons From Disaster Risk Reduction and
Climate Change Adaptation Planning

Climate change adaptation and disaster risk
reduction mainstreaming has been slowly incorporated into the development sector since the 1990s.
Both the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) and the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP) support knowledge-sharing
platforms on climate change adaptation, including the Global Adaptation Network (GAN), which
serves to link organizations around the world.33
Climate change adaptation is cross-disciplinary,
and the mine action sector will need to engage with
regional organizations and authorities undertaking climate vulnerability assessments and climate
scenario planning. The NDC Partnership website also hosts a platform to search country level
climate progress and information on the focal
point for in-country engagement.34 Engagement is
important to ensure that the mine action sector can
build resilience.
ThinkHazard! is another web-based tool that
was developed to support non-specialists in considering the impacts of natural disasters on projects.35
Figure 4. Map showing deforestation since 2000 within Quảng Trị
ThinkHazard only provides high-level guidance
Province.
for a region but gives a general overview of potenFigure courtesy of Earth Map/Hansen et al, Science 2013.
tial hazards, highlighting how these may change in
the future as a result of climate change. The Red
Environmental Data Sources
Open-source environmental data can also inform climate change Cross Red Crescent Climate Centre also provides guidance on simadaptation planning. Earth Map was developed by Google and the ple climate change adaptation actions and has produced climate
UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and launched in factsheets for some countries, detailing regional climate change
36
2020.32 Earth Map gives free access to a wide range of climate and projections.
With limited guidance currently in place for the mine action
environmental data—including rainfall, temperature, elevation,
sector, the introduction of climate change adaptation principles
slope gradients, vegetation cover, deforestation, and changes in
must be supported. This would have the potential to reduce future
surface water occurrence—which can be used to build an underimpacts on operations, improve the efficacy of current work, and
standing of the local and regional environmental conditions. Data
help build climate resilience for communities.
on deforestation (see Figure 4) is valuable to understand both the
potential risks to mine action operations—e.g., increased surface

Conclusions and Recommended Next Steps
Incorporating climate change–related risk assessments into
existing prioritization strategies is key. This would require the
coordination of NMAA with country-level adaptation planning
by local governments and initial evaluations of whether CHAs
or suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) containing EO are within
climate vulnerable areas. This includes areas prone to fluvial or
surface-water flooding, areas close to slopes susceptible to collapse, or where there have been high rates of deforestation. These

areas may need to be prioritized for clearance, if they are deemed
at risk to the unpredictable effects of climate change. Delaying
clearance introduces the risk that these areas may be more difficult
and costly to clear in the future and presents additional hazards to
the local community. Alternatively, prioritization of an area may
be needed to facilitate the implementation of a climate adaptation
scheme (e.g., catchment management or flood alleviation) considered of high benefit to the community.
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Awareness Raising

No sector is immune to the effects of climate change. Awareness
raising is needed to inform mine action operators, mine action
authorities, donors, and affected communities on the relationship
between EO and climate change risks. This is especially important
for traditional HMA donors. Awareness must be raised about the
benefit of funding HMA, which aligns with climate adaptation
measures designed to support local communities as part of postclearance land use.
Good Practice Guidance

As well as incorporating climate change and risk management
into national mine action strategies, development of a new IMAS
specifically to address climate change risks and adaptation planning is recommended, with cross reference to other relevant IMAS
(such as 07.13, 07.14, 08.10, 08.20). A new IMAS should include
guidance on the identification of current and future climate vulnerabilities assessment of climate risks, identification of adaptation
options, implementation, and monitoring and review.
Climate Data, Climate Projections, and Early-Warning Systems

Historic climate data and knowledge of regional climate trends
can be a first step in better understanding the current climate
change risks. As well as collaborating with regional authorities,
information on climate change risks should be collected and evaluated as early as possible, with community engagement on climate
change forming part of the NTS and CL process. In some cases, it
may be necessary to monitor severe weather events and develop an
early warning system where increased risks to local communities
are possible.
Collaboration and Strengthening Community Resilience to
Climate Change

Aligning HMA with community-led climate change adaptation
initiatives on land cleared of EO will provide multiple benefits and
help to support more sustainable livelihoods. Without an aligned
approach, there is a risk of further degradation of already marginal
land. From the onset, early partnerships between HMA, environmental authorities, and local climate adaptation organizations are
recommended to facilitate an improved approach.

30

Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, the estimated shortfall in
HMA funding was US$1 billion—only 0.4 percent of overseas aid
is allocated to mine action. This shortfall will likely increase with
further budgetary pressures on donors. This means that comprehensive approaches to HMA have even greater importance, where
donors can foresee multiple benefits such as linking HMA with climate adaptation for local communities.
As McCosker from NPA noted

“It comes down to a question of
priorities, in terms of whether we
look at the immediate threat, which
is people being unable to farm or use
their land because of the continuing
impact of explosive ordnance. Or,
do we look at the longer-term threat
where they might not be able to use
their land in the way that they want to
because of climate change impacts? “
Ultimately, as McCosker also noted, a balance between the shortand longer-term objectives is needed. This must be clearly communicated to donors and support must be afforded by the mine action
sector and local stakeholders. Due to the intimate relationship with
the environment and HMA’s goal to support local communities,
there is an opportunity to achieve both and to ensure communities
can adapt to future and current climate change challenges.
See endnotes page 70
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In early 2021, fourteen-year-old
Awin was working as a shepherdess
in north Iraq when she came across
items on the ground. Although many
of the other shepherds normally
move these items out of the way,
she remembered a MAG risk education session she’d participated in
that had taught her not to do this.
“I was up here with the goats when
I found these. I immediately recognized them because MAG had
talked about dangerous bombs in
our school,” Awin remembers. She
knew to contact the local MAG community liaison team who came and
marked the items. Later, a MAG
team destroyed the items.
The Sharbazher District in Iraq is
known for its agricultural land, where
many landmines remain decades after
they were laid. Awin’s story highlights
how much the land is still used by the
community and the importance of risk
education sessions.
Images this page courtesy of Sean Sutton/MAG.

By Sebastian Kasack [ MAG, Mines Advisory Group ]

T

he relevance of risk education is widely
acknowledged as reflected in the Oslo
Action Plan (OAP) with its distinct chapter on ‘Mine risk education and reduction’ and
five explicit actions. Good risk education must
be tailored. MAG’s experience delivering explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) in fourteen
countries confirms the relevance of tailoring
EORE to the local reality: to people’s risk taking behaviors, to the actual explosive ordnance
(EO) threat, to seasonality, availability of people
for risk education sessions, and approaches that
respect gender and diversity and take conflict
sensitivity into account.
Awin with her flock.
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31

EORE1 was first piloted in El Salvador in 1982, nearly forty years
ago. The mine action sector knows that in order to effect lasting
behavior change, a person needs to
• understand the threat
• recognize explosive devices
• differentiate between a dangerous and a safe or safer area
• understand what risk-taking behavior entails and its potential consequences
• know what to report and to whom when spotting EO
• choose actions that increase personal safety
• be empowered to assist others when encountering EO or an
EO accident
This article discusses how Mines Advisory Group (MAG) tailors its EORE sessions in more than fourteen countries globally2
in accordance with the OAP (Actions #29 and #30), agreed to by
the 164 States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention
(APMBC) at the Review Conference in 2019.

OAP Action #29 calls to “provide context-specific mine
risk education and reduction programmes to all affected
populations and groups at risk. Ensure that such programmes are developed on the basis of a needs assessment, that they are tailored to the threat encountered
by the population, and that they are sensitive to gender,
age, disability and take the diverse needs and experiences of people in affected communities into account.”3

OAP Action #30 calls to “prioritise people most at risk by
linking mine risk education and reduction programmes
and messages directly to an analysis of available casualty and contamination data, an understanding of the
affected population’s behaviour, risk pattern and coping
mechanisms, and, wherever possible, anticipated population movements.”4

For EORE to resonate with persons living, visiting, or working
in EO-affected areas, the messaging must be relevant, simple, accurate, accessible, and culturally-sensitive.

Tailoring EORE
Threat Encountered by the Population (OAP Action #29)
Tailoring EORE starts with understanding the EO threat; there deployed along with minefield locations, patterns, and tactics to
is no need to learn about anti-vehicle mines or cluster munitions tailor the EORE content to the local threat. These close relationif there is no threat from these types of ordnance in a particular ships between technical and CL staff guarantee that EORE is taiarea. In initial visits to a new location, community liaison (CL) lored to the local threat.
teams conduct EO contamination baseline assessments
(CBAs) to gain an understanding of how the specific area
was affected by conflict, what
types of ordnance might be
present, and the community’s
exposure to the contamination. This information is then
fed into the EORE process to
begin tailoring messages and
materials.
MAG’s EORE is presented
by CL staff who work closely
with local clearance teams5
to ensure that the EORE
delivered mirrors the actual
threats beneficiaries are likely
to encounter. In Angola, Iraq,
South Sudan, and Bosnia and
MAG Angola works with MAG’s only youth EORE trainee, Minga (eighteen years-old),
Herzegovina, MAG employs who lost her sight and one arm due to a mine accident when she was six. While tailoring
several deminers who were EORE is crucial to promote lasting behavior change, it is equally important to deliver
part of the forces that laid these messages professionally, working through well-trained, gender-balanced teams
mines during conflict. CL (MAG or implementing partner staff), teachers (who are often local), and community
At times, these educators include EO survivors delivering the life-saving
teams use this first-hand focal points.
messages.7
knowledge of the ordnance
Image courtesy of MAG Angola.
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In any given country, the EO
threat can evolve over time and
EORE therefore must adapt to
reflect the realities on the ground.
In northeast Syria, MAG’s initial
intervention came on the heels of
an Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
(ISIS) retreat from the area leaving
behind mostly improvised mines,
abandoned improvised explosive
devices (IEDs), and booby-traps.
However, the latest round of fighting resulted in large-scale displacement and more widespread
unexploded ordnance (UXO) contamination. In Iraq, contamination In Syria, MAG’s CL teams use age-specific EORE by incorporating games into sessions
has come in waves: the Iran-Iraq to increase children’s participation and maintain their interest.
War (1980–1998), Operation Desert Image courtesy of MAG Syria.
Storm, the conflict beginning
in 2003, and the rise and fall of ISIS. Throughout, materials and community leaders, women’s rights organizations, etc.). To this
end, MAG undertakes gender and diversity analyses to inform its
approaches were adapted to reflect the changes in the EO threat.
EORE programming.
Gender, Age, Disability, and Culture and Taking into
In Nigeria, MAG delivers EORE to the general at-risk popuAccount the Diverse Needs and Experiences of People in
Affected Communities (OAP Action #29)
lation, applying the age and gender lens to target adult men and
The exposure to EO contamination and the risks taken by a ten- women (age 18+), male and female teenagers (12–17), and younger
year-old schoolgirl are necessarily different than those of a fifty- boys and girls (6–11). To help tailor the messages to specific audiyear-old hunter or a twenty-five-year-old farmer.6 In addition to ences, the sessions begin with a dialogue to gain an understanding
developing EORE messages that speak directly to the needs and of the participants’ knowledge about the area’s background, comexperiences of different groups, EORE sessions can be planned munity composition, history, conflict impact, humanitarian chalto target those specific subpopulations and the people who have lenges, types of contamination, etc.
the most influence over their behavior (e.g., adolescent boys, male
In South Sudan, MAG’s operations demonstrate that men are
more difficult to reach with risk education than women, girls, and boys since they
attend community sessions less often. As in
other countries globally, men are statistically more likely to be killed or injured by
EO than women; therefore, MAG’s CL teams
make a concerted effort to schedule risk education session locations and times to match
the schedules demanded by male-dominated
livelihoods. Accordingly, sessions are now
held at cattle camps and during periods
between grazing.
Tailoring EORE to be inclusive for persons
with disabilities is still an area MAG is working to improve. Persons with visual impairments miss out on key content in standard
formats, such as banners/visual images, while
A village in al-Hassakah Governorate in Syria. Defensive minefields left
persons with auditory (hearing) impairments
behind after the conflict with ISIS led to high accident and casualty rates,
miss out on the live presentations.
with children figuring highest. On average ten persons (mostly boys) lost
In northeast Syria, MAG’s CL teams protheir lives per village due to EO, including some booby-traps. EORE sessions
vided
four EORE sessions in 2018 to children
were tailored to address the threat from improvised mines and booby-traps.
at
New
Horizons Association learning center
Image courtesy of MAG Syria.
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with the support of staff who use sign language. Jawahar Abdo, a
hearing impaired seventeen-year-old girl, participated. One of her
family members had lost his life in a mine accident when he tried to
escape from Ar-Raqqa city when it was under ISIS control. Jawahar
notes
One month ago, I attended one risk education in
the camp where I live now, but I did not understand
anything because they were speaking orally but now
by the cooperation between you and our teacher
using sign language, the session was perfect. I and
my mates believe that we have understood everything from you; now I can distinguish between mines
and other dangerous items, I know what a mine is,
how to be safe and whom to inform; when I go back
to my home in Ar-Raqqa, I will apply all things that
you taught us today, it was great, thank you.

Analysis of Available Casualty Data (OAP Action #30)
In addition to understanding the threat itself, understanding and
analyzing EO incidents and accidents8 is key to tailoring EORE. A
number of lines of inquiry can contribute to tailored EORE plans
and are detailed in Figure 1. MAG teams apply a gender- and agesensitive lens when analyzing questions relating to casualty data.9
Accident data relevant to EORE:
• Age/gender of victim
• Accident location
• Activity at time of accident
• Knowledge/lack of knowledge of victims to the threat,
including whether the victim had attended EORE
Figure 1. Relevant considerations when analyzing EO accident data to tailor EORE messages.

In May 2021, MAG’s CL team received a
call reporting a bomb in a Yazidi village in
Sinjar, Iraq. When they arrived to assess the
area, they were shocked to find a group of
children playing with an unexploded artillery
shell in the street. The children believed
the shell to be harmless as they had been
playing with it for a few days and nothing
had happened. The shell was in fact fuzed.
Any slight knock could have caused it to
detonate.
They had been unbelievably lucky.
Kheder, aged eleven, said “I have seen a
bomb in a house just over there. I know
of other bombs around here as well.” The team immediately delivered rapid response risk education to the
children, using posters and flyers to explain the danger and reported the dangerous items to MAG’s technical
team. The CL team also visited the families of the children playing with the shell. One of the mothers said,
“We came back to the village last September because our life was difficult—there was no work. Our house
was damaged by ISIS, but we are
rebuilding it. But we are still afraid
because the areas around us are
not safe. And now we find out that
the children were playing with a
live bomb.”
MAG is working to teach the
families in this village how to
stay safe until all the unexploded
bombs and landmines are cleared.
As one of the biggest Yazidi
villages in Iraq, it has suffered
horrific attacks during the
conflict and large areas remain
contaminated.
Images courtesy of Sean Sutton/
MAG.
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MAG Vietnam EORE material and key messages tailored to farmers, children, and youth. Hotline numbers are
regularly used by locals.
Figures courtesy of MAG.

In Somalia from 1999 to 2019, EO caused 3,313 casualties. Since
2015, children represent 78–88 percent of all known casualties.10 As
recently as August 2021, two boys in central Somalia found a hand
grenade in a field and were injured when it exploded.11 Tailoring
EORE to reach children is a challenge when schools are closed due
to the COVID-19 pandemic. Even when schools are in session, it
is more difficult to reach girls due to low school enrollment rates.12

In South Sudan, where EO accounted for 40 percent of the
conf lict-related casualties among children in 2020,13 reaching children has been a priority. MAG has recently met with the
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) to explore synergies
and develop child-friendly messaging in schools and household
sessions.

Groups at risk/
socio-professional categories

Reasons for risking exposure and vulnerability to explosive ordnance

Nomads and herders

Considered to be at risk because of their activities, through which they often encounter EO, nomads and herders often find themselves trapped in dangerous areas. Many
nomads, their families, and their livestock become EO victims.

Truck/bus drivers and travelers in the desert

Drivers and travelers sometimes get lost in the desert. If they are not aware of explosive devices, warning signs, danger zones, and how to adopt safe behavior, they can
be the victim of accidents.

Traditional route tracking guides

Given the heavy EO contamination, people who specialize in recognizing desert
routes are helping travelers. These people are an at-risk group if they fail to identify
danger zones and signs and can benefit greatly from improving their knowledge of
EO safe behaviors. Guides can pass on key EORE messages to travelers who have not
previously attended any EORE sessions.

Women and girls

Women during domestic activities, especially when foraging for firewood, water,
and dates, may move in or near dangerous areas and encounter EO. Some become
victims due to handling EO. In Kalait, collecting wood for profit is very widespread.

Children

Children are at risk because of their curiosity to tamper with EO. A fairly large
number of children in the intervention area herd livestock in the grazing areas. Even
children going to school have encountered EO around or along the paths leading to
schools.

Community leaders

By strengthening their capacities on EORE messages, community leaders can disseminate these messages to travelers to allow them to stay away from hazardous
areas, stay safe during their journey, and to report the EO identified during their trip.

Men and boys

Men engage in the exploitation of natural resources such as natron14 and in breeding
livestock and growing dates. During these activities, they can be exposed to EO.

Figure 2. An example of MAG’s CL team assessment for the province of Ennedi Ouest, Chad, which relates how these groups are
exposed to explosive devices taking a gendered approach.
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Video still from the BOMB video created by MAG Myanmar. The video disseminates EORE safety messages featuring
contemporary dance and spoken word poetry written in local languages.
Image courtesy of MAG.

Burma/Myanmar. During the COVID-19 pan-

choreography inspired by key EORE safety messages, which was filmed in a natural location so
that it would resonate with young rural audiences. Spoken word artists provided a unique
voiceover in the form of poetry that incorporated key EORE safety messages matched to the
interpretive dance. By working with a set of ethnically diverse local poets, MAG ensured that the
content was tailored and accessible to different
ethnic groups living in Kachin and Shan States.
The campaign was launched on MAG
Myanmar’s Facebook page in mid-September
2020 and ran until the end of November 2020.
Combined, the videos reached more than a million people, with over 120,000 engagements. The
videos have also been shared with CL staff and
community volunteers who have used them as
additional material when delivering EORE to
communities.

Zimbabwe. In Zimbabwe’s mine-affected com-

safety messages address risk attitudes and
practices while proposing realistic solutions.
MAG plans to ask mothers or wives of victims/
survivors to pass on effective and credible EORE
messages. Same-sex facilitators, peers, and
respected authorities such as police or army personnel are useful in conveying safety messages
to at-risk communities.

demic, MAG developed five videos in Jinghpaw,
Shan, and Burmese languages to raise awareness about the dangers of landmines/EO and
safe behaviors among communities in Kachin
and northern Shan states, in partnership with
Sin Sar Bar, a local social media enterprise.15
Two videos were made with local celebrities
who had a broad appeal within their respective
ethnic groups: one video featured the Kachin
celebrity Daw K Jar Nuu and the Shan musician Ko Han Tun. They were identified because
of their cross-generational appeal, which would
ensure that a broader audience clicked on the
videos and listened to the key safety messages.
Another set of videos was made with the dance
group Revolution Dance Crew to appeal to a
younger audience of teenagers and millennials.
The Revolution Dance crew designed a modern

munities, women’s roles include collecting firewood, cultivating land, cross-border trading,
and searching for water, among others. Due to
these gendered roles, women acquire unique
knowledge about mines and other EO. To obtain
this information, MAG works in mixed and segregated settings, as appropriate, to ensure that
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Internally displaced persons (IDP) camp in Dohuk,
Iraq. Yazidi children are recognizing EO they
encountered while they fled their home areas. CL
teams in Duhok generally focus on cluster munitions
and conventional mines, but include information
on improvised mines where relevant for IDPs from
Ninewa and other governorates.
Image courtesy of Sean Sutton/MAG.

Everyone has the right to access life-saving
information. A MAG CL team delivers an EORE
puppet show to children with disabilities in
their school in Lebanon, February 2019.
Image courtesy of Sean Sutton/MAG.
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Understanding the Affected Population’s Behavior, Risk
Pattern, and Coping Mechanisms (OAP Action #30)
EORE needs assessments can be large and costly undertakings,
which can include Knowledge, Attitude, Practice/Belief (KAP/B)
studies integrating quantitative and qualitative approaches.16 Less
cumbersome and costly approaches are systematic focus group discussions (FGDs) prior to the onset of an EORE campaign.17
MAG’s CL teams carry out a CBA and/or FGDs prior to an EORE
campaign with different segments of the population (community
leaders, civil society organization leaders, groups of women, children, victims/survivors of explosive devices, hunters, shepherds,
etc.). The discussions center around the topic of EO and help the
CL teams to understand the types of explosive devices present in
the community, the extent of the contamination, differing impacts
of EO contamination on the community, and the behaviors the
community has adopted in response to this threat. Information
gathered in the CBA guides the risk education strategy through
prioritization and helps to identify the most relevant messages for
each community and risk group.
MAG teams aim to reach specific risk-taking groups such as
shepherds (mostly boys/young men), scrap-metal dealers, or scrap

collectors. Understanding the population also requires understanding their daily, weekly, and seasonal routines:
• During which months of the year is risk-taking behavior
occurring?
• When is the best time to reach specific populations (e.g., children, adolescents, women, and men)?
• Where is it best to reach them (e.g., at home, in the fields,
hunting hut, etc.)?
Addressing existing coping mechanisms can be tricky, as they
usually involve risk-taking behavior such as moving explosive
devices, including mines. Coping mechanisms include passing the
risk on to others who may be better equipped (village deminers/
ex-soldiers, etc.) or persons who take the job due to financial need,
such as seasonal workers. Discussing such behavior during FGDs is
one way to address these issues. However, if there is no fast and reliable way of removing the threat via EO disposal or clearance, the
population will continue to rely on its coping mechanisms despite
being aware of the associated risks. Therefore, an integrated EORE
response aims to link mine action with community development
workplans and community investment programs.18

In Chad it is difficult to reach those most at risk, including nomads and herders, because of their mobility. MAG’s CL teams travel
several miles and start early in the morning when these populations are more willing to devote time to MAG’s EORE sessions.
Here, MAG conducts a risk education session for the benefit of nomads who camped 25 km from Kalait in the province of Ennedi
West in Chad on 16 September 2020.
Images courtesy of MAG.

Anticipated Population Movements (OAP Action #30)
EO contamination threatens millions of people in post-conflict
environments. Populations fleeing war, settling in camps near
EO contamination, as well as those deciding to return to or check
on their homes, may face life-threatening situations that were
not present when they were originally displaced. For displaced
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persons, EORE must be tailored according to the target audience’s
intentions for movement and/or resettlement.
In Iraq in 2020, MAG CL teams received news of people returning to a village with known EO contamination; however, CL teams
could not deploy to the area to conduct EORE sessions due to
COVID-19 restrictions. As an emergency response, EORE was

Northern Mali has strong cultural norms that need to be fully respected. MAG and local NGO partner Tassaght work with
Tamashek and Arab communities, where women are not supposed to participate in discussions with men who are not their
husbands. In Menaka and Kidal regions, for example, women will ask for permission from their husbands before sitting with
visitors, even with fellow women. CL teams first reach out to men to seek their approval before setting up a gathering with
women, conducted by a female CL officer. These meetings provide an opportunity for women to share their feelings about the
threat of EO and how this threat impacts their livelihoods.
Image courtesy of MAG Mali.

conducted by phone for more than 1,000 families based on a tenminute script tailored to the specific contamination of the village
to which they were returning.
MAG Iraq and Syria collaborated in preparing EORE materials
for Syrians arriving in Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) following
the start of military action in northeast Syria on 9 October 2019.
A total of 21,540 Syrians crossed into KRI;19 the expectation was
that many would return to northeast Syria soon after. MAG produced photographs indicating how to recognize dangerous areas

and warning signs, and used the local dialect for messaging that
is used in the areas to which they would be returning after acute
conflict subsided.
Another tailored approach, institutional EORE, involves reaching out to institutions in line with their work/activities and how
the EO contamination may affect them. For example, the teams in
Nigeria conduct sessions for community and IDP camp leaders,
camp committees, women leaders, service providers, government
officials, and aid workers.

Security Context and Applying Conflict Sensitivity
EORE during and post-conflict addresses a sensitive subject,
including the laying of landmines and improvised devices, setting
up booby-traps, etc. However, anyone with this type of information may be looked upon with suspicion and receive an unwanted
visit by intelligence services. Therefore, both educators and their
audiences need to be protected from harm. How materials are
designed, what questions are asked during sessions, and how messages are delivered make a difference. Someone who reports the

location of EO may face serious repercussions. However, excluding
the entire subject of improvised mines, for example, is also not the
right answer. Conflict-sensitive programming of EORE is required
in such circumstances: whereas teams should not ask community
members to report improvised mines to the authorities, asking
them to report UXO is fine. Moreover, CL teams should encourage community members to alert their family members, neighbors,
and visitors.
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Educating children needs to be fun. EORE
for Syrian children in Lebanon is tailored
to the specific age groups, usually for
those six-to eleven-years-old / twelve to
seventeen years old.
Images this page courtesy of Sean Sutton/MAG.

Children share materials with
their parents and siblings,
thereby multiplying the
learning effects. Following the
session, these children know the
hotline number by heart.

Children use EORE materials that
show how to avoid mines and other
EO. It is essential to field test new
materials, messages, and approaches
when creating and delivering EORE.

EORE saves lives but needs to be
done well to resonate with people
so that it leads to safe behavior
when confronted with
EO contamination.
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Challenges Encountered when Tailoring EORE
As noted previously, tailoring
requires understanding the EO
threat, risk-taking behavior, and
the cultural and environmental contexts of at-risk groups.
When setting up an EORE program, this information is likely
not available and, especially
in emergency settings, there is
insufficient time to undertake
a thorough EORE needs assessment.20 For example, EO accident
and casualty data continue to be
hard to obtain in many countries and/or it does not provide
sufficient detail. Nevertheless,
delaying lifesaving EORE is not
an option.
The solution is to identify
as much relevant information as possible, and to start gathering
data from the onset. Key informant interviews and FGDs can be
done immediately to help shape the EORE response. Regular internal and external quality assurance will reveal weaknesses in the
EORE approach, delivery, messaging, and materials/means used.
In such a scenario, teams should schedule a review and redesign
the approach once sufficient experience implementing EORE has
been gained.
Material design and messaging is usually controlled by the
national mine action authority (NMAA) or a UN organization. 21 While controlling EO-safety messages and materials used
in a given country is useful, messages must be coherent across
the sector and materials must fulfil minimum requirements.
However, the control can be too rigid and/or too time consuming

Video still from MAG’s animated video from Lao PDR in which
EORE material is tailored for children.
Image courtesy of MAG.

to allow for the timely adaptation and tailoring of messages,
materials, and approaches. Good coordination and collaboration across the mine action sector and among EORE managers
and operators help minimize hurdles in reviewing and adapting
delivery. Having regular technical working group meetings has
proven beneficial if well-prepared and actions are monitored.
Incorporating EORE into the quality management undertaken
externally by the NMAA and/or United Nations and other organizational bodies also assists in strengthening the capacity of the
staff assessing the work of EORE operators and reaching a common understanding of what entails best practice.

Conclusion
EORE saves lives but needs to be done well to resonate with
people so that it leads to safe behavior when confronted with EO
contamination. The OAP (for the period 2019–2024) stresses the
need to tailor EORE approaches, messages, and means. MAG’s
experience delivering EORE in fourteen countries confirms the
relevance of tailoring EORE to the local reality: i.e., people’s risktaking behaviors, the actual EO threat, seasonality, availability of
people for EORE, and approaches that respect gender and diversity
and take conflict sensitivity into account.
See endnotes page 70
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank his colleagues from fourteen MAG
programs worldwide for their contributions to this article.

Sebastian Kasack
Senior Community Liaison Advisor
MAG (Mines Advisory Group)
Sebastian Kasack has been working in the
humanitarian mine action field for twentyfive years with NGOs, the United Nations,
and as a consultant. Since 2016 he is the
Senior Community Liaison Advisor for MAG
(Mines Advisory Group). Kasack holds a master’s degree in
Geography from the University of Bonn and a postgraduate
degree on Developing Countries from the Swiss Federal Institute
of Technology, Zurich. He is also a certified mediator and gained
an advanced course certificate on conflict transformation (Bern).
From 2019 to 2021, he was co-chair of the EORE Advisory Group
for MAG.

ISSUE 25.2 @ FALL-WINTER 2021

41

Explosive Ordnance Risk Education
By Kim Fletcher and India McGrath [ The HALO Trust ]

I

n early 2020, The HALO Trust (HALO) in partnership with Al Ghad conducted a "barrier analysis"
with youth in Mosul, Iraq to determine the constraints they faced in adopting safer behaviors
related to explosive ordnance (EO). Through the barrier analysis, HALO and Al Ghad found that
youth with lower perceived self-efficacy, beliefs that an EO accident would not likely result in severe
consequences, and friends who encouraged unsafe behaviors were all more likely to engage in less
safe behaviors than their counterparts were. The findings enabled HALO and Al Ghad to tailor their
EORE messaging to these barriers in an effort to promote safer behaviors and reduce risk taking. This
article outlines the process of conducting the barrier analysis survey and analysis of the findings. In
addition, lessons are identified for those who may wish to adopt a similar approach in the future.
While the intent of explosive ordnance risk education (EORE)
is to encourage shifts in behavior, across the mine action sector,
there are few practical methods of gathering and analyzing data
that helps operators understand why some groups are at greater
risk than others and the determinants of behaviors that EORE
messaging might be able to affect. This gap is particularly acute
in contexts where EO casualty monitoring is not yet systematic or
widespread. In those instances, understanding who is at risk and
the knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors that lead to those risks is
largely based on anecdotal evidence. This lack of generalizable data

then sometimes leads to EORE interventions that are not based
on empirical evidence and that rely on generic, less-targeted, and
possibly less-applicable messaging, or messaging targeted at those
who are perceived to be at the highest risk, while possibly missing
groups who actually are at higher risk.
Barrier analyses may help mitigate both of these limitations in
the current practice. Conducting barrier analyses can help determine what groups are most likely to engage in risky behaviors and
can give risk education operators a more complete picture of why
each group engages in those behaviors.

Conducting Barrier Analyses
Barrier analyses are surveys that are designed to improve understanding of the factors that influence particular behaviors. The
approach surveys whether respondents do or do not engage in
certain behaviors of interest. Respondents are then asked a series
of questions about the personal, social, and environmental factors
that might affect those behaviors. Finally, the data are analyzed by
comparing the personal, social, and environmental factors among
the doers with those of the non-doers for the behavior of interest.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

If the responses between doers and non-doers are similar, then that
factor is not considered an influencing factor in the behavior itself.
If the responses of doers and non-doers are different, however, then
the assumption is that factor influences the behavior in some way.
In a complete barrier analysis, questions related to twelve “determinants of behavior”1 are included alongside questions related to
the specific behaviors of interest. These determinants were derived
from theories of behavior, and they include people’s perceptions of:

Self-Efficacy: belief that one has the knowledge and skills to do the behavior
Social Norms: the perception that people important to the actor think the actor should do the behavior
Positive Consequences: the positive things the person thinks will happen as a result of doing the behavior
Negative Consequences: the negative things the person thinks will happen as a result of doing the behavior
Access: the availability of needed products or services required for doing the behavior, including barriers related to the cost, distance, and cultural acceptability of products and services
Policy: the presence of laws and regulations that may affect whether people are able to do a behavior
Culture: the extent to which local history, customs, lifestyles, values, and practices may affect behaviors
Cues to Action/Reminders: the presence of reminders that help someone remember to do the behavior
Susceptibility: a person’s perception of how likely it is that the negative consequences of a behavior will occur
Vulnerability/Severity: the perceived degree of severity of the negative consequences that could occur
Action Efficacy: the extent to which a person believes a behavior will lead to the associated positive consequences or avoid the
associated negative consequences
Divine Will: the extent to which a person believes actions and their consequences are the result of God’s will and therefore out of
their control

Because the survey questions are designed around each of these twelve determinants, it is possible to discover during the data analysis
which of the twelve have the greatest influence on a particular behavior.

Photo courtesy of HALO.
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Applying the Barrier Analysis Approach in Mosul, Iraq
HALO in Iraq partnered with a local organization—Al Ghad
League for Women and Children—to deliver risk education in
Mosul Old City and to design an additional open-ended project
aimed at limiting the risk of a target group who was identified by
the local community.
HALO and Al Ghad, with remote support and consultation from
the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
(GICHD), conducted a series of key informant interviews and
focus group discussions (FGDs) to ascertain the community’s
perceptions of who were the most at-risk groups in Old City, and
their proposed solutions for those groups. Overwhelmingly, the

key informants and FGD participants identified children and teens
as the most at-risk groups. Incidentally, they also overwhelmingly
suggested the development of a recreational space to provide alternatives for playing and relaxing in unsafe areas.
While the response from the community was largely uniform
regarding who to target and the solution proposed, HALO and Al
Ghad still wanted to survey the target group to determine what
they thought put them at risk, their barriers to safe behaviors, and
their proposed solutions and priorities. Due to the specific constraints of the project, HALO and Al Ghad decided to focus their
efforts on adolescents (13- to 24-year-olds).2

Survey Design
To separate the doers from the non-doers, four behaviors were
included in the survey:
1. Whether the target group had touched or moved explosive
items in the last year
2. How often the target group enters areas where there is rubble
nearby (often, sometimes, or never)
3. How often the target group members go into areas where
they have seen explosive items in the past (often, sometimes,
or never)
4. How often the target group go into areas where adults do not
go or other abandoned areas (often, sometimes, never)
These four behavior questions served as the dependent variables, and the answers to these questions were tested against the
determinants of behavior to illustrate which of the determinants
affected the likelihood of engaging in safe or unsafe behaviors. The
determinants tested included self-efficacy, social norms, perceived

susceptibility, and perceived severity. Further detail on the specific
questions asked is given in the next section.
In addition to the behaviors and determinants, open-ended
questions were asked of respondents:
• what they know that can help keep them safe
• what they would like to know to help them avoid an accident,
and
• what they think about a project that could help them stay
safer.
Finally, due to the overwhelming preference among the adults
toward a park or recreational area, the teens were specifically asked
whether they believed a recreational space would help them, and if
it would, what type of space they would use. The complete survey is
available upon request.3

Survey Methodology and Sample
The surveys were disseminated in-person in Mosul Old City
over a two-week period in October 2020. They were typically
delivered in conjunction with risk education sessions. EORE
attendees between 13- and 24-years-old were asked to participate, as were others in the target age range who the teams saw outside of the sessions. To limit the potential spread of COVID-19,
EORE sessions and surveys were conducted outdoors, the teams
maintained physical distance, and the surveyors wore surgical

masks. The goal was to survey sixty people, and ultimately sixtyseven respondents (thirty-two female and thirty-five male) were
included. The plurality of male respondents (43 percent) were
between thirteen- and fifteen-years-old, and a further 29 percent
were sixteen- to eighteen-years-old. Among female respondents,
38 percent (twelve) were between thirteen- and fifteen-years-old,
while 25 percent (eighteen) were sixteen- to eighteen-years-old.

Current Behaviors
The data were first analyzed to determine the prevalence of each
of the four behaviors of interest: whether the respondents touch or
move explosive hazards, and whether they enter places with rubble,
where they have seen EO in the past, or where adults do not go/
other abandoned areas. Each of these behaviors would be considered unsafe, and the goal was to determine whether and why adolescents engage in them.

Of the fifty-eight respondents who had seen an item of EO in
the last year, 38 percent reported they had touched or moved a
found item at least once. Over half (55 percent) of the adolescents
reported at least sometimes going into areas where there is rubble
nearby, and similarly, more than half (52 percent) of the respondents who have seen EO in the past report at least “sometimes”
going into areas where the EO was spotted.
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Finally, the survey explored the frequency with which adolescents enter areas where adults do not go or that are otherwise
abandoned. These abandoned areas are the least frequently entered
dangerous areas overall, with just 6 percent of respondents reporting that they often and 27 percent reporting that they sometimes
enter them. Here, unlike the questions related to rubble and where
they had seen EO, the differences between men and women were
stark, with no women often entering abandoned areas compared
with 12 percent of men.
While it is not possible from these data to compare adolescents’
risk-taking levels with other groups, the data suggest there is a high
level of risky behavior among those surveyed, and that there is a

substantial amount of room for adolescents in Mosul Old City to
alter their behaviors to help keep themselves safer. The data also
suggest that both females and males are engaging in these behaviors, with girls being more likely than boys to report entering areas
near rubble, while boys are slightly more likely to touch and move
items or enter abandoned areas.4 Therefore, while existing accident
data often suggests boys are at higher risk of accidents, the behaviors data indicates that girls can equally benefit from EORE messaging and should continue to be targeted.
The questions that follow from this behavior data are, “what is
driving these behaviors, and what messaging or means of message
delivery could help to limit them?”

Determinants of Behavior
As described previously, four potential determinants of behavior were included in the survey. The responses to the determinant
questions were then cross-tabulated with those from the behavior

questions to determine to what degree each of the determinants is
related to the behaviors.

Self-Efficacy
The primary question related to self-efficacy asked in
Yes, Can Avoid Possibly No, Cannot Avoid
the survey was “Do you think you can avoid an accident Touched or Moved Item
from explosive items?” Table 1 shows the relationship Yes, touched/moved
0%
33%
44%
100%
67%
56%
between those who believe they can avoid an accident, No, has not touched/moved
those who think they can “possibly” avoid an accident, Enter Areas with Rubble
50%
53%
66%
and those who do not believe they can avoid an accident as Yes, sometimes or often
No, never
50%
47%
35%
well as the four behaviors surveyed.
The findings suggest a strong relationship between per- Enter areas EO Seen in Past
Yes, sometimes or often
50%
60%
52%
ceived self-efficacy and behaviors among those included No, never
50%
40%
48%
in the sample. Among those who believe they can avoid an
Enter Abandoned Areas
accident, no one reported touching or moving an item that Yes, sometimes or often
12%
35%
41%
88%
65%
59%
they have found. In addition, just 12 percent of those who No, never
believe they can avoid an accident report entering aban- Table 1. Behaviors among those who think they can and cannot avoid an
accident.
doned areas, compared with 41 percent of those who do
Figures courtesy of the authors/HALO.
not believe they can avoid an accident.
In all, these data indicate that one aspect of the messag- they can at least decrease their risk of being in an accident.5 If the
ing toward adolescents should be that through improving their adolescents’ perception of their ability to reduce their own risk
knowledge and awareness, and slight adjustments in behavior, improves, they may also decrease the frequency of risky behaviors.

Social Norms
The questions regarding social norms all centered around the
respondents’ perceptions of their friends’ thoughts on each of the
behaviors. Surveyors asked what the respondents’ friends said
about going into areas where there is rubble, going into areas where
they have seen explosive items, going into areas where adults do not
go, and touching or moving items. The surveyors were instructed
to listen to the responses, and record whether what was said fit best

Touched or Moved Item
Yes, touched/moved
No, has not touched/moved

into “they encourage it,” “they discourage it,” or “they do not talk
about it.” Regarding touching or moving items, the possible categories included “they touch or move items,” “they approve of it,” “they
disapprove of it,” or “they do not talk about it.”
The relationships between each behavior and friends’ acceptance
or encouragement of it are given in Tables 2 and 3:

They Touch/Move

Approve

Do Not Discuss

Disapprove

100%
0%

88%
13%

20%
80%

27%
73%

Table 2. Touching or moving items based on friends' attitudes.

44

THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

As with perceived self-efficacy, there is a strong relaEncourage
Do Not Discuss Discourage
tionship between the social norms surrounding behavEnter Areas with Rubble
iors and the behaviors themselves. Every adolescent who Yes, sometimes or often
100%
28%
56%
reported that their friends touch or move items said that No, never
0%
72%
44%
they touch or move items as well, while 88 percent of
Enter Areas EO seen in Past
those who reported their friends approve of touching or
Yes, sometimes or often
100%
45%
38%
moving items indicated they had touched or moved an
No, never
0%
55%
62%
explosive hazard. Conversely, just 27 percent of those
whose friends disapprove of touching or moving items Enter Abandonded Areas
Yes, sometimes or often
90%
24%
21%
reported doing so themselves.
No, never
10%
76%
79%
A similar trend is seen regarding entering potentially
dangerous areas. When friends encourage the behav- Table 3. Entering dangerous areas based on friends' attitudes.
ior, between 90 and 100 percent of respondents report
engaging in the unsafe behavior. When friends discourage the change communication practices, these messages should be posibehavior, however, it is only done 21 to 56 percent of the time.
tive and appeal to the youths’ perceived social roles. For example,
These findings suggest that if a goal of EORE sessions is to “Friendship means keeping one another safe,” or “As your friend,
limit people’s dangerous behaviors, then two forms of messag- I think you should leave that alone.” Second, it may help to equip
ing could be beneficial. First, adolescents should be encouraged adolescents with possible responses when friends do encourage
to spread safety messages to one another. Following behavior them to behave in unsafe ways.

Perceived Susceptibility and Severity
To measure perception of susceptibility,
Somewhat/
Very Serious
Serious
respondents were asked whether they think
Not At All Serious
they will see an explosive item in the next six Touched or Moved Item
months. To determine perceived severity, they Yes, touched/moved
23%
55%
42%
77%
45%
58%
were asked how serious it would be if they No, has not touched/moved
set off an item by accident. Possible answers
included “very serious,” “somewhat serious,” Enter Areas with Rubble
39%
73%
79%
“not serious at all,” or “don’t know/prefer not Yes, sometimes or often
No, never
61%
27%
21%
to answer.”
Overwhelmingly, the respondents believed Enter Areas EO seen in Past
32%
64%
83%
they would see an item in the next six months. Yes, sometimes or often
No,
never
68%
36%
17%
In addition, those who said they would likely
see an item also reported they were more likely Enter Abandonded Areas
to go into potentially unsafe areas than those Yes, sometimes or often
21%
36%
51%
who said they would not likely see an item. No, never
79%
64%
50%
Rather than indicating that increase in “per- Table 4. Behaviors and perceived severity of an accident.
ceived susceptibility” drives less safe behavior,
this finding more likely indicates the respondents have an accurate be “very serious” and those who think it would be “serious” or just
understanding of where items are likely to be found. That is, those “somewhat serious,” with those perceiving the less severe outcomes
who go where there is rubble, where they have seen EO in the past, also being more likely to engage in risk behaviors.
or into abandoned areas report increased susceptibility because
Among EORE practitioners, it would be easy to believe that all
they are more susceptible, not because the perception of suscepti- attendees at a session inherently understand the potential severity
bility is driving the behavior.
of an accident. However, these data suggest not only that there is a
Perceived severity of an accident, however, may influence adoles- wide discrepancy in adolescents’ perceptions of what the result of
cents’ behaviors. The relationship between perceived severity and an accident might be but also that this discrepancy leads to differbehaviors is presented in Table 4. Only one respondent believed ences in how they act in regards to EO. Emphasizing the real danthat accidentally setting off an item would be “not at all serious,” so gers and consequences of explosive hazards, therefore, may help
their responses are combined in the table with those who believed reduce risky behaviors among the target group.
an accident would be just “somewhat serious.” There is a clear difference in behaviors among those who believe an accident would
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Conclusion: Potential for Future Use
Perceptions of self-efficacy, social norms regarding behaviors,
and the perceived severity of an accident were all related with the
likelihood of engaging in unsafe behaviors among the respondents surveyed. These findings suggest that emphasizing youth can
limit their risks of an accident and providing realistic depictions
of the severity of an accident may help promote safer behaviors.
In addition, providing messages that adolescents can pass along to
one another and equipping them with the means to respond when
friends encourage unsafe behaviors may limit their risks.
While the findings related to the external risk-reduction project
are not discussed here as they were not part of the barrier analysis itself, the youth overwhelmingly spoke in favor of developing a
park or greenspace in Old City to provide a safe place to relax and
play: the park opened in August 2021.
The use of the barrier analysis in this project illustrated three
ways a similar approach may be incorporated to improve future
EORE design and delivery.
First, the approach can simply be repeated in other areas and
with other demographic groups. It is unlikely that the drivers of

Barrier analysis delivery in Mosul, Iraq.
Photo courtesy of HALO.
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behavior for adolescents in Old City will be the same as those for
rubble removers in Syria, scrap metal collectors in Afghanistan, or
agricultural workers in Colombia. Barrier analyses can be useful
tools at the project design phase to determine which groups are
enacting unsafe behaviors at the highest rates and specific messaging for those most at risk.
Second, components of the barrier analysis can be incorporated
into the ongoing monitoring and evaluation processes of EORE
delivery. A few determinant-related questions can be added to
existing risk education tests so that, over time, the behaviors and
constraints on behaviors of different groups can be better understood. The information gained from these survey questions can
help give a better idea of what groups are engaging in risky behaviors when there is insufficient accident data, and it can feed into the
design and delivery of future RE sessions or materials.
Thirdly, over the last several years, risk education practitioners
have increasingly recognized the importance of measuring behavioral change associated with their activities. While there are several challenges with measuring changes in actual behaviors, it may
be more straightforward to measure changes in barriers to safe
behaviors that can be affected by EORE. Borrowing questions from
the barrier analysis would be useful in that regard.
In delivering and analyzing a barrier analysis in Mosul Old City,
the experiences of HALO Iraq, the Al Ghad teams, and GICHD
suggest it can be an efficient and useful tool for understanding target groups’ behaviors and the determinants of those behaviors. The
findings can then be used to develop specific messaging and delivery techniques that can improve the effectiveness of EORE sessions
and materials. Further, this line of questioning may be useful in
measuring the impact of EORE. While behaviors themselves are
not directly observable and can be difficult to capture, barrierrelated questions regarding safe behavior can help determine
whether EORE is effectively reducing those barriers. This measurement can be done either through stand-alone data-collection exercises or through the incorporation of components of the barrier
analysis into already existing monitoring and evaluation tools.
See endnotes page 70
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Konduga internally displaced persons (IDP) camp in Borno State, where
towns and camps are garrisoned and surrounded by defensive trenches as
protection against attacks by Boko Haram and other non-state armed groups.
All images courtesy of Sean Sutton/MAG.

HIDDEN CRISIS IN

Borno State
Borno State

By Sean Sutton [ MAG, Mines Advisory Group ]

A

t the end of 2019, Nigeria reported a significant increase of landmine, explosive remnants of war
(ERW), and improvised explosive device (IED) contamination in its states. In 2019 alone, a total
of 239 known mine casualties were recorded in Nigeria. Although the exact amount of contamination in Nigeria today is unknown, the Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor asserts that Borno is the
most heavily affected state in the country. Due to mounting mine contamination and increasing pressure
from non-state armed groups (NSAG), internally displaced persons (IDPs) and communities are unable
to safely return to the region.
Extensive landmine use by Boko Haram has created a state of crisis in the region and the number of
casualties continues to grow. The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) reported in late 2020
that NSAG were more frequently targeting civilian populations. The conflict between NSAG and the local military has been steadily depositing explosive devices throughout the region, including improvised
devices using adapted submunitions.
The hostile situation has led to a shortage of resources for the distressed communities and a lack of humanitarian access, impeding recovery efforts. Farmer and civilian casualties continue to climb as people
are displaced, unable to return to their homes for fear of their safety.
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These images were projected at the International Festival of Photojournalism,
Visa Pour l’Image in France, September 2021.
I travelled to Borno State, northeast Nigeria, for six weeks in
October and November 2020 to document life in internally displaced persons (IDP) camps, the impact of the current conflict on
people, and Mines Advisory Group’s (MAG’s) work there. Explosive
ordnance—improvised landmines and unexploded ordnance—is
part of this story. In Nigeria, I documented MAG’s work: helping
people to be safer in a dangerous environment through risk education and gathering evidence of hazardous contaminated areas.
I spent some time in and around the state capital of Maiduguri
and travelled by helicopter a number of times to governmentcontrolled towns and enclaves (referred to as local government

areas [LGAs]). Due to frequent ambushes, travelling by road is
unadvised and only by convoy with a military escort when possible. Improvised landmines are often used in these attacks.
I also spent time in Bama and Gwoza, strategically important
towns previously controlled by Boko Haram. Gwoza was named
by Boko Haram as their “califate capital” until the army wrestled
it back in 2015. These LGAs come under regular attacks and many
people searching for firewood or in their daily farming activities
have been killed and abducted as they head out across the defensive
anti-vehicle trench lines.

In a makeshift unofficial camp for IDPs displaced by the conflict in Maiduguri, Modu
Amara explained what had happened to his village and his people:
The insurgents came into the village with vehicles shooting at 5 p.m. in the evening.
They fired everywhere and we all ran to the bush as quick as we could. We came back
the next day and everything was burnt. Two children had been burnt in a house. All
the animals were killed. All was gone so we had to come here to Maiduguri.

Woodcutters are paid to chop tree trunks for
firewood, a precious resource in the camps.
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Mamza and her friend Falmata were badly injured when Falmata’s nine-year-old grandson Mustapha detonated
a rocket-propelled grenade he was playing with. Mustapha and his fourteen-year-old uncle Bakura thought the
grenade was part of the water pump and brought it back to the IDP camp where they shelter in Maiduguri.
Mustapha was killed instantly in the explosion. Bakura survived.
Falmata is one of MAG’s trained focal points for landmine and explosive ordnance reports in one of Maiduguri’s
IDP camps and is very supportive of the work MAG has been doing here. Her husband Umar is the main Bulama
or village chief, senior to the ten other Bulamas in the camp. They have nine of their own children as well as four
adopted orphans. I met her in her smoky kitchen on a wobbly bench, as one of her children tended a steaming pot
in the background:
It is important work, people often find dangerous explosives and its thanks to MAG that they know what
is dangerous. Just two weeks ago, a woman reported to me that she had found something on a wire near
a school 3 km up the road. I went and looked—from a distance—and saw a milk tin with a wire. I told the
military and they dealt with it. An old woman was out fetching firewood. She found a hollow log with a big
bomb inside it. She reported it to the military at the gate, and they blew it up. She recognized it because of
MAG. The work—it is good and it saves lives.

The village of Maiborti is 15 km south of Maiduguri on the road
to Damboa. The attack mentioned previously happened in 2018.
Since abandoning the burnt-out village, people have been going
back to farm and they have paid a great price for doing so.
Akila, Usman, and Rukiya use large posters depicting improvised landmines made from everyday items: cooking pots, jerry
cans, and tins. Other explosive threats like mortar bombs, rockets, and machine-gun ammunition feature along with caricatures
demonstrating safe and good as well as dangerous and bad behavior. The highly experienced and skilled communicators guide the
captivated audiences through the lessons. What should you look
out for? What should you do if you are suspicious of something
or an area? Who should you report it too? This frequently leads to
reports of dangerous areas or locations of dangerous items.

The teams work with focus groups on gathering information and
mapping it. During Contamination Baseline Assessments, roads,
rivers, villages, and landmarks are drawn into the dust. Stones,
leaves, and branches are useful props, marking houses, suspected
landmines, or explosive ordnance. People are very animated and
deep discussions ensue. The agreed map is then drawn on paper
with all the information gathered and noted in detail. This local
knowledge is very valuable and helps determine dangerous areas
that can help prioritize clearance for safe returns as and when the
security situation allows.
Everyone here has a story, and Thlawur’s is no exception. During
a lunchtime break, protected from the searing sun by the shade of a
big tree, she told me her story:
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I have suffered in the conflict but now I am helping others to survive. I started working with MAG
in 2017. My family was living in Baga (on the shores of Lake Chad), but we had to leave because
of insurgents in 2012 and we moved to Dele where we stayed until July 2014. When Boko Haram
attacked the town, they killed my younger brother, they killed my uncle, they burned him and
his child. We fled to Uba. We were there for five days and were attacked again. We fled for our
lives and went to Yola. We left my grandmother there because she wasn’t strong enough to move
herself. That was how she died. We were in Yola for two to three months until it was attacked, so
we ran for our lives to Jos.
Now I am helping other people with my work. When people go out, go to farm, they are at risk.
But if I give them risk education, it will help them to identify it and it will save their lives. We tell
them about the dangers and what to do if they encounter bombs. We tell them who to report to
and what they should do to protect their lives. We put the safety messages into songs and play
games so that they understand the messages. We also gather information on contaminated areas
and map the information.

MAG teams of community liaison staff work across the region, usually doing three-week stints, often in
difficult conditions. In Bama’s General Hospital camp, the team organizes separate groups of men and women in
preparation for life-saving lessons related to explosive ordnance. One of the community liaison officers (CLOs), a
young woman called Thlawur, entertains a large and growing group of children. This is the most fun the kids have
had in ages, they are ecstatic—totally overexcited. She leads the crowd of kids away from the risk education lessons
across to another part of the camp to stop them from disturbing the lessons for the adults. There is little for the
kids to do in the camp: no TV, no PlayStation, in fact the only toys you see are homemade, like wire buggies with
bottle-top wheels.
Thlawur has the kids dancing and singing songs with lines like “What do you do if you find a bomb?”
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As I was leaving the camp on my last day in Bama, I saw a distinguished looking man with a smart embroidered hat and shirt. I
stopped to take his portrait, and he explained that he was Aga Jato, the
Bulama from Kimeri village. He told me everyone had fled three years
ago and can never go back because there are improvised landmines
on all the tracks. As we were talking, a crowd gathered and different people added their landmine story. One man called Jelomi from
Mairamburi village described how he stepped on a mine: “It made a
loud bang and metal cut my leg,” he said pointing at a scar running
around his left calf muscle, “but the mine didn’t go off properly. It was
made from a milk tin and it was the lid that cut my leg.” Jelomi was
fortunate—the explosives didn’t go off, and it was probably the force
of the detonator that blasted the lid into his leg.

The men described all sorts of things they have seen made into
improvised landmines from perfume bottles to cooking pots. They
explained that the army cleared the main routes, but roads to small
villages and all of the tracks and paths were mined. They said that
there was a lot of unexploded shells and bombs as well from all of
the fighting that has happened over the years. “More than 300 villages around here are mined!” Umar Modu Saya told me.
In Gwoza, Boko Haram’s former califate capital, the camp chairman of the GSS IDP camp Ibrahim Mbaya explains that two weeks
earlier there had been a well-coordinated and intense attack by
Boko Haram. T he camp was caught in the cross fire of the nighttime attack:
See endnotes page 71

Rockets and bullets were flying, we all lay on the ground in fear. We could hear the insurgents calling out “Allahu Akbar”—it was very frightening, and we have all experienced this
before. The attacks also mean there are unexploded shells. We are grateful to MAG for
helping us learn how to recognize the threat. People find things now and report them to
me rather than trying to pick them up.

Teenager Mamma Buji is one of thousands of children taught to
stay safe by MAG staff. The lessons use song and puppet shows.
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In Bama, people explain to MAG staff where they
have seen unexploded devices. This survey work
is essential to help keep people safe.
Lessons in Bama camp.

Sean Sutton
Photojournalist and International Communications Manager
MAG (Mines Advisory Group)
Sean Sutton is an award-winning photojournalist; his wellknown pictures show the impact of landmines and explosive
remnants of war on communities and have been published and
exhibited all over the world. His book documenting how unexploded ordnance affects people in Laos was runner-up for the Leica
European Publisher’s Award. Sutton is MAG’s international communications manager
and has worked for the organization since 1997.
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An armored long-arm excavator
demonstrates the raking of ground
for IED clearance during a training
task in Fallujah.
All images courtesy of UNMAS Iraq.

Observations from Iraq
By Pehr Lodhammar and Mark Wilkinson, Ph.D. [ United Nations Mine Action Service (Iraq) ]

M

echanical equipment has been in the inventory of conventional military forces for the purposes of
military engineering—including demining—since the Second World War. The integration of mechanical equipment into the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) Iraq clearance activities may
have therefore seemed a natural evolution from what might be considered ‘conventional’ mine clearance, yet it
brought with it a number of issues. First, the absence of any clear doctrine for the use of mechanical equipment
in improvised explosive device (IED) clearance generated resistance and criticism from specialist IED clearance
companies operating at that time in Iraq. It was argued that mechanical operations were not only at odds with
the principles and philosophies of IED disposal (IEDD) then used, but that they were also dangerous. Second,
those same companies argued that the use of mechanical equipment would be extremely limited—largely to
‘shifting and dumping’ rubble and other detritus. Finally, it was argued that manual teams were quicker, more
flexible, and cheaper. While UNMAS pushed ahead with the integration of mechanical equipment into standard
clearance team structures, it did so in a carefully considered way. Analysis and evaluation has shown a clear role
for mechanical equipment in IED clearance, albeit with some key factors that must be carefully considered. These
include assessments of likely IED types and main charges as well as quantities present, the proximity of people,
buildings, and secondary hazards as well as the original ground level and composition. A critical analysis of the
most common concerns cited over the use of mechanical equipment in IED clearance provides ample evidence
that not only can mechanical IED clearance be conducted safely, but it also offers some key advantages over
manual activities.
The use of mechanical assets in the clearance of explosives from
the land is nothing new. While not used in the field of humanitarian mine action (HMA) until the early 1990s, mechanical
equipment had been in the inventory of many countries’ military
minefield clearance units since 1942.1 By 2004, a detailed Geneva
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) study
of mechanical applications in demining had identified thirty-five
machines designed and developed specifically for that purpose.2
Without exception these machines were intended for the clearance

of conventional minefields, yet their application was less than perfect. Criticisms included them sometimes throwing mines into
cleared areas, failing to detonate mines, burying mines deeper in
the ground, as well as opinions that the machines were less than
optimal in operational use because of the costs associated with
purchasing and running them.
By 2015, in the face of IED contamination following the Islamic
State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) occupation of parts of Iraq, it
was clear that trying to tailor even an emergency response to the
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most immediate need for clearance required novel and innovative
approaches demanding specialist skillsets and procedures different from those seen in a “normal” mine action program. While
UNMAS Iraq quickly and successfully deployed multiple clearance teams across the liberated areas of Iraq reaching Mosul even
as fighting continued, it was clear even in the earliest stages of
response that the sheer volume of rubble, partially-demolished
buildings, and other battle detritus in areas requiring clearance
meant that there was a need for mechanical support. It was also
clear that neither the necessary doctrine nor working practices
existed to effectively use these machines in the delivery of IED
clearance activities. This was the start point from which UNMAS
began to develop its understanding of the role of mechanical
assets in IED clearance.

A good example of the environmental
impact of conventional mechanical
demining. The right of the picture
represents ‘before’ and the left ‘after.’
The exposure of top soils and removal
of vegetation is obvious.

The Basics
In order to consider the integration of mechanical assets into IED
clearance plans, one must first accept two key points. First, regardless of whether they are cleared manually or mechanically, IEDs
are an explosive hazard (EH): As long as they are safely removed,
the methodology used to achieve this does not matter. Second,
there is no need to recover either complete IEDs or component
parts for evidential (or any other) purposes. If, for example, IED
components are forcefully separated during clearance, it does not
matter—again, they just need to be safely removed. The sheer scale
of contamination in Iraq dictates that IEDs should also be removed
quickly. Mechanical options for clearance therefore potentially
have clear advantages over other manually-based methods.

So What is the Problem?
In the early stages of the UNMAS emergency response in Iraq, it
was apparent that “traditional” mine action actors simply did not
have the skills and capacity to conduct IEDD on a massive scale
in a “high threat” environment. In most cases, the only individuals trained to a high enough standard to conduct IEDD activities
within this environment came from military forces, and almost
without exception, western militaries. As a result, the emergency
response that UNMAS initially required came from commercial
companies that were arguably more quasi-military than civilian
due to their largely ex-military staff, most with little or no experience in HMA.
In the absence of applicable International Mine Action
Standards (IMAS) or any other HMA-based IEDD doctrine, these
companies developed their own operating procedures that in some
cases were little more than a “cut and paste” of military ones. In
Iraq, the government forbade the importation or use of explosives
by commercial organizations. This, along with operating locations
often littered with rubble and debris, made the use of costly explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)/IED robots non-viable. As a result,
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In the early stages of the UNMAS emergency
response in Iraq, it was apparent that “traditional”
mine action actors simply did not have the skills
and capacity to conduct IED disposal (IEDD) on a
massive scale in a “high threat” environment.

the semi-remote separation of IED components—where a disposal
operator manually connects tools to render safe the device, operating them from a distance (normally by rope)—became ubiquitous.
This method satisfied the need for “remote actions where possible” that was entrenched in most military IEDD doctrines, and
circumvented the requirement for disruptors or other explosive
render safe tools. It was clear that there was simply no incentive
for these companies to attempt to develop a sophisticated role that
went beyond shifting and dumping of materials with mechanized
equipment. Why would they when maintaining large, international-staff-heavy organizations and manual-team methodologies
justified high-value contracts?3 The reluctance of international
clearance contractors to integrate mechanical equipment into their
clearance methodologies was a significant obstacle, both in terms
of gaining acceptance of the value of this equipment, and in identifying and integrating the correct skillsets in projects dominated by
traditional IEDD operators. Some senior IEDD experts even publicly argued that mechanical assets could not, and should not, be
used for clearance of IEDs.

An armored front-end loader demonstrates
rubble removal on a training task.

What Changed?
As the emergency response phase transitioned into a stabilization
and then a humanitarian one, changes to the structure of commercial contracts slowly opened the door for international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) to enter the Iraqi clearance “market.”
As they arrived, they brought with them not only new perspectives on IED clearance drawn from their extensive experiences in

(not-for-profit) humanitarian demining elsewhere in the world, but
also their different methodological approaches, which made significant use of mechanical assets. In addition, while UNMAS had, from
the outset, defined a role for mechanical support to clearance, this
now presented the opportunity to begin developing specific clearance methodologies for IED environments.

The Operational Use of Mechanical Equipment
The use of mechanical equipment in Iraq has followed a pathway of evolution, responding to operational requirements, available funds, and the development of operating procedures. Without
exception, UNMAS Iraq projects have utilized front-end loaders
and long-arm excavators, always with armor protection for the
operator and task-specific attachments (such as rakes). In general
terms, the main uses addressed are:
• Access. Commonly within urban areas to clear roads and
access routes of rubble and detritus in order to reach task
locations and clear incident control points (ICPs), facilitating vehicle movement.
• Rubble. Clearance of rubble within a task location, normally
including rubble removal and spreading out rubble for manually checking before moving the rubble off site/recycling.

•

•
•

Ground clearance/proving. More common in rural
areas to clear access lanes for technical survey (TS), subject
to threat assessment.
IED location. Normally within rural environments with
the aim of visually locating IEDs while moving rubble/earth.
IED render safe/removal. Using mechanical equipment
to separate an IED into its component parts and removing it
from its emplaced position into a safe area.

While there are multiple possible roles for mechanized equipment, their use is not straightforward, and a number of factors
affect and influence deployment.

The Main Considerations
The integration of mechanized equipment within IED clearance
operations is not just influenced by the environmental context, nor
by the operational objective of their use. Cost of equipment is and
remains a significant consideration in clearance activities. Much
like an aircraft parked on a stand, if mechanical equipment is not
being used, it still costs money; and worse, the environment of Iraq

quickly degrades equipment parts, such as hydraulic hoses, due
to the intense UV radiation. Planning and careful management
can mitigate expensive down time, but further work is required to
understand how many hours per week machines must work to justify their cost. The impact of other variables, such as area cleared,
must also be included in this analysis.
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An armored long arm excavator clears
rubble in Old Sinjar.

A number of other factors are at play that require careful consideration, in particular within the context of risk assessment:
• Main charge type/size. This is perhaps the single most
important consideration prior to deployment. Where the risk
of blast effect from the unintended initiation of the most commonly found plastic-cased main charges may be acceptable in
terms of the level of operator protection provided, for heavycased, metal, main charges (such as artillery shells) it may
well not be. While the main charge container is an important
consideration, so too is the weight and type of explosive fill.
An ammonium nitrate–based explosive will clearly have a
lower velocity of detonation and therefore less brisance than,
for example, a commercial RDX- or HMX-based explosive.4
A further significant consideration is in areas where shaped
charges are present; the consequences of a directional impact,
even on armor, is likely to be devastating.
• Proximity of other devices. Where mechanized equipment is used for IED location/render safe/removal in IED
belts, careful consideration must be made in terms of the
proximity of other devices, and in particular the possibility
of propagation of an explosive event.
• Proximity of people/buildings. As with all IEDD
activities, careful consideration should be made to any
cordon required to protect persons or property from the
events of an unintended explosion.
• Location of secondary hazards. Often neglected
in clearance planning, it is arguably more important to
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consider secondary hazards in post-conflict environments
than in other home security IEDD environments. It is often
the case that flammable materials as well as other explosive
items litter task areas, especially within complex urban environments.
• Environmental impact. While not always a key factor
for consideration in planning, the environmental impact of
mechanical clearance activities should be considered. While
further research is required, in particular relating to possible
mitigations required, it seems clear that mechanical removal
of the top soils of a location—often under windy conditions—may have negative consequences for future land use,
especially agriculture.
• Weather/ground type. The effects of poor weather, in
particular heavy rainfall, can obviously have a significant
effect on the friction coefficient of soils, as well as the drawbar pull available to vehicles.5 That said, extreme weather
also severely impacts manual clearance activities. Further
research to determine at what point work should cease in the
face of inclement weather is required.
• Original ground level. It is apparent from UNMAS activities across Iraq that care is required, particularly during
mechanical rubble clearance, to correctly identify the original ground level in an area. The application of the clearance
depth standard must be applied to the original and not the
rubble ground level.

Fundamentals of IEDD Versus Mechanical Clearance
An initial glance of the United Nations IED disposal (UNIEDD)
standards would seem to directly challenge the use of any mechanized equipment in IED clearance operations.6 Indeed, these standards do not even consider the use of mechanical equipment for
IEDD. In terms of the principles of IEDD, a number of them are
clearly directly at odds with the use of mechanical equipment;
“remote means where possible” and “minimum time in target area”
would seem to be the most obvious contradictions.7 Additionally,

and certainly within the context of UNIEDD standards, mechanical
equipment operators are ordinarily not IEDD or even EOD trained,
suggesting it would seem to be impossible to integrate mechanical
equipment into clearance operations at all. In order to rationalize
this juxtaposition, one must compare the predominant opinions on
the use of mechanical equipment in IED clearance with the reality
of what the evidence gathered by UNMAS during mechanical IED
clearance activities in Iraq to date actually suggests:

EXPERIENCE SAYS victim-operated IEDs (VOIEDs) require specialist IEDD operators to safely conduct render safe procedures.
EVIDENCE SAYS no, mechanical equipment operators have been successfully trained to recognize unexploded ordnance
(UXO) as well as IEDs and their component parts to a level sufficient to recognize and render safe IEDs. Almost without exception, mechanical equipment is used successfully and exclusively against VOIEDs.
EXPERIENCE SAYS the use of mechanical equipment against VOIEDs will cause high numbers of unintended initiations of
devices.
EVIDENCE SAYS not true. For one implementing partner working with UNMAS in Iraq and surveyed during this research,
there were zero detonations (partial or full) out of a total of 1,299 IEDs cleared by mechanical equipment since 2018 across their
UNMAS-funded projects. Across that partner’s entire work completed from July 2018 to September 2021, of 3,501 IEDs mechanically cleared, there were five partial detonations—representing only 0.1428 percent of the total.8 These detonations resulted in no
casualties or wider damage.
EXPERIENCE SAYS mechanical equipment is slower than well-trained manual search teams.
EVIDENCE SAYS not necessarily. In areas with mineralized earth, or excessive metal contamination, the daily productivity
of mechanical clearance teams often far exceeds that of manual teams. That said, mechanical equipment needs to be carefully
integrated within clearance plans. The intelligent use of TS in particular is a critical enabler for the subsequent use of mechanical
equipment to its maximum effect.
EXPERIENCE SAYS the use of mechanical equipment for IED clearance will result in targeting of that equipment.
EVIDENCE SAYS not a valid comment. UNMAS is only mandated to clear legacy IEDs. To that end, UNMAS would not
operate in an area where active targeting was taking place. It is true that a small number of vertically-emplaced pressure plates
have been recovered from Fallujah, and that these were assessed to have been emplaced to target Iraqi Security Forces using
bulldozers for clearance.9 It is assessed that current mechanical IED render safe methods would go some way to reduce the effectiveness of these devices should they function. It is obvious that standard operating procedures (SOPs) for the use of mechanical
equipment in IED clearance must be regularly reviewed and sensitive to specific threats that may exist within task areas. This
may mean that in certain threat environments mechanical equipment will have more limited application.
After even a superficial analysis of the opportunities to use
mechanical equipment in IED clearance, the prevalence of conventional IEDD philosophy and mindsets does appear to reflect
the most common preconceptions about its safe and effective use.
One of the key observations and lessons drawn from the experiences of UNMAS in Iraq since 2015 is that, as an HMA community, we should be constantly encouraging and searching for
innovative and new techniques in order to conduct clearance more
safely and effectively. Any assessment of the clearance techniques
applied within HMA environments should be evidence-based, not
prejudiced by the experience of IEDD operators (in particular)
trained within military forces. The reality of the evidence currently available suggests that mechanical equipment can play an
integral part in large-scale IED clearance.
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The Future of Mechanical IED Clearance: Further Discussion Needed
The analysis presented here appears to warrant further development work to continue to effectively and safely integrate mechanical equipment into IED clearance projects. That said, a number of
issues do require further focus:
• Definition of role. Mechanical equipment brings clear
advantages to IED clearance operations but is not a panacea. Careful consideration of its expected outputs must be
made at the planning and procurement stages. The front-end
loader and long arm excavator have become quite ubiquitous
on UNMAS Iraq projects, but there are opportunities to add
other equipment types. UNMAS Iraq has experimented with
smaller equipment such as the “Bobcat,” and results so far
appear encouraging. Any mechanical equipment used in
IED clearance must be decided based upon a clear requirement, not merely the claims of manufacturers that their specific pieces of equipment are effective.
• Integration. Evidence so far suggests that this equipment
must be integrated with clearance teams in a comprehensive
way. Effective use of mechanical equipment is the result of
intelligent task management. The use of TS is critical in maximizing output. In addition, careful consideration must be
given to the type of follow-up activities required for quality
control (QC) and quality assurance (QA) processes.
• Cost-effectiveness. It is easier to predict the cost of
clearance with mechanical equipment (per square meter)
than it is for manual clearance activities, not least because
the mechanical rate is consistent against multiple variables
that affect the progress of manual teams.10 These indicative
costs have broader utility in better budget-centered procurement. That said, when mechanical equipment is contracted,
it is vital that it be fully utilized to prevent parked-up costs
escalating. The creation of pools of equipment shared across
multiple projects may be an option to facilitate this.
• As an enabler. If mine action activities are an enabler of
subsequent development, in particular stabilization activities, then it seems clear that the presence of mechanical
equipment on clearance sites offers other knock-on benefits.
These could include wider area clearance, rubble recycling,
and other civil engineering works (to include excavation for
reinstatement of services). Careful analysis of the specific
needs of a clearance area could demonstrate considerable
cost and time savings through a more joined-up approach to
meeting the stabilization and other needs of the work area.
• Clearance versus civil engineering. There is the possibility of a considerable lack of clarity between what mechanical equipment contributes when working in IED clearance
and when that activity becomes civil engineering activity
(for example in demolition). On a small scale this may not be
problematic, but where specialist work (e.g., the breaking of
concrete slab, cutting of reinforcement bar, and demolition
and removal of structures) is necessary in order to give an
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•

•

assurance of the absence of EH in a specific task area, careful
management is required. This is not just to exploit opportunities for possible enabling activity but also to ensure specialist equipment is budgeted and available along with personnel
with the correct technical training and experience needed in
order to ensure safe and effective work delivery.
Specifications for armor. Regardless of the operational
methodology used in mechanical IED clearance, the specifications for the armor applied to mechanical equipment does
require further research and direction. In particular, consideration is required relating to the protection offered against
metal-cased main charges, fragmentation, and blast/heat
effects. There is a definite lack of information currently available on testing of armored equipment against IEDs.
International standards. There is a strong case for the
need to better integrate guidance on the mechanical clearance of IEDs into both IMAS and UNIEDD guidance. An
initial technical note could be extremely valuable. This
work should include careful considerations on the specific
requirements for QC, in particular with regards to depths of
clearance in rubble against original ground levels.

Non-armored equipment such
as this Bobcat has been utilized
to enhance clearance activities
in confined and cluttered
spaces.

The collapsed grain silo in Ramadi, Iraq, provides an excellent example of the blurred boundary
between using mechanical equipment for IED clearance and civil engineering (demolition) works.

This is not to say
“one size fits all” for the use of
mechanical equipment, but where
would you rather be when a 20 kg main
charge functions—8 m away in an armored
cab or 50 cm above the point of detonation?

Final Thoughts
The work of UNMAS in Iraq has shown there is an important
role for the use of mechanized equipment in IED clearance. While
UNMAS has attempted to drive an evolution in the integration of
mechanical equipment into IED clearance teams, there is clearly a
need for the formalizing of thought in its use as well as producing
subsequent authoritative guidance.
Unintended initiations of devices are sadly inevitable when conducting IEDD on the scale of clearance activity in Iraq; however,

within a carefully considered risk-management process, evidence
gathered by UNMAS Iraq to date suggests that survivability for
operators contained within armored equipment is far higher than
those conducting manual actions on devices. This is not to say “one
size fits all” for the use of mechanical equipment, but where would
you rather be when a 20 kg main charge functions—8 m away in an
armored cab or 50 cm above the point of detonation?
See endnotes page 71
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Decades of Agreement, Few
Results on Arms Record-Keeping
Loose guns in Mali.
Image courtesy of Sean Sutton/MAG.

Issuing a registered arm in Burkina Faso, 2015.
Image courtesy of Sean Sutton/MAG.
By Philip Alpers [ Centre for Armed Violence Reduction ]

R

ecent developments in computerized record-keeping for state-owned arms, ammunition, and
explosives now offer simple, affordable solutions in the lowest-capacity environments. A global
partnership between Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and the developers of ArmsTracker software promises to break a twenty-year logjam that, until now, has denied comprehensive, affordable
weapon and ammunition record-keeping systems to states in greatest need.
Beginning in the 1990s, key agencies in humanitarian mine action
(HMA) gradually broadened their missions to include weapon and
ammunition management (WAM). For example, MAG initially
cleared stockpiles of illicit and excess arms and ammunition as
part of its mine action programs in Angola, Burundi, Cambodia,
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC); helped with safe
ammunition storage in Iraq;1 and currently secures and destroys
small arms and ammunition in nineteen states in Africa, Asia,
Latin America, and the Middle East. MAG increasingly considers
these more comprehensive capacity-building frameworks as contributing to armed violence reduction (AVR), alongside a growing
focus on complementary engagement at the community level.2
In a prescient policy brief in 2012, the Geneva International
Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) explored “the rationale for this shift from ‘traditional’ mine action to AVR,” noting
that “the role of mine action organizations in supporting AVR is
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invaluable…their relevant expertise, the innovative approaches
that they are adopting (e.g., towards community safety), as well as
the relationships they have already built with national security sector actors give them unique insight, leverage and opportunity to
contribute to AVR.” As a significant incentive for this shift, GICHD
observed that “in many contexts the threats to safety and security
posed by arms are far higher than threats from mines and [explosive remnants of war] ERW.”3 In a 2019 report, the United Nations
Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) noted that WAM
“is becoming a key component of conflict prevention and stabilization strategies, with many conflict-affected and post-conflict States
in Africa increasingly implementing a range of WAM activities.”4
Yet in expanding their brief from locating and destroying explosives one by one to destroying mines, surplus arms, and ammunition, and then perpetually securing the storage of millions of
weapons and munitions in ongoing daily use, AVR practitioners

A collage of ArmsTracker screenshots showing the home or login pages of several installations. Installed with
government agencies across the Pacific and Africa, ArmsTracker can be switched to local languages.
Image courtesy of CAVR.
now face an ever more pressing need. Despite many attempts, no status reports in formats consistent with various international
digital record-keeping solution for state-owned arms has emerged instruments including the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and the Susto standardize the ongoing management of stockpiles of arms and tainable Development Goals (SDGs). ArmsTracker installations
are also underway with military, law enforcement, border conammunition in low-capacity countries.5
trol, and other agencies in Palau,
To fill this gap, MAG is curData
Security
Fiji, and West Africa. In a project
rently launching AVR pilot projfunded by the United Nations
ects with a potential software Countries often store some of their most
solution in Burkina Faso6 and sensitive information in an arms manage- (UN), 8 the Small Arms Division
Sierra Leone. ArmsTracker (www.
ment system. To guarantee data protection, of the Economic Community of
armstracker.org) is a computer- ArmsTracker is installed by the state’s own
West African States (ECOWAS)
ized record-keeping solution for
security and IT experts. A client agency’s in Abuja, Nigeria, has installed
state-owned arms, ammunition data never leaves its premises unless IT staff
ArmsTracker in readiness for data
and explosives, purpose-built choose to share limited reports, for example input from government agencies
for small island and developing with another state entity. ArmsTracker data
across the fifteen member states
9
nations by the Centre for Armed
is isolated from all other files, with security of ECOWAS. Although Arms7
Violence Reduction (CAVR). A
settings and encryption configured only by Tracker confidentiality agreeregistered charity created by facthe client. No network or Internet connec- ments prevent disclosure of arms
and ammunition quantities or
ulty from the School of Public tion is required.
methods by other than the govHealth at the University of Sydney,
CAVR partners with MAG and others to provide ArmsTracker at ernments themselves, the small arms to be recorded across these
no net cost to qualifying government agencies in countries where projects number in the hundreds of thousands.
Highly-secure and easy-to-use, ArmsTracker requires only
the need is greatest.
CAVR’s first proof-of-concept installation of ArmsTracker was a standalone PC with Microsoft Office to enable accurate, comwith the government of Samoa, where an eighteen-month pilot prehensive record-keeping in local languages. This simple yet
project successfully digitized records of the country’s state-owned powerful software computerizes small arms, ammunition, and
small arms. The government is now equipped to generate instant explosives record-keeping, storage and destruction, imports, and
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ArmsTracker stores internationally standardized details of each arm, a tamper-proof history of each transfer, GPS
coordinates, and more.
Image courtesy of CAVR.
exports. Every installation is tailor-made for each government need for accurate local data is more than just a wish-list item from
agency involved to fit with national and regional laws, to simplify a bevy of UN and European Union (EU) agencies, think tanks,
consistency with multilateral agreements such as arms embargoes, and NGOs in the global north. From 2012 to 2017, the UN Office
anti-terrorism, and transnational crime control instruments, and for Disarmament Affairs logged more requests from UN Member
other relevant international
States for assistance with WAM
Tamper Protection
instruments, all to prevent illicit
than any other category regarding
use and diversion of weapons ArmsTracker stores a cradle-to-grave log of
conventional arms.11 In 2021, there
every transaction made within the system. are still twenty-nine outstanding
and ammunition and to reduce
This permanently identifies the user respon- requests from Sub-Saharan Africa
armed violence. Consultation,
sible for each addition or edit. As the records alone for international assistance
customization, and installation
cannot be deleted, ArmsTracker provides to improve record-keeping capacis followed by staff and coma chain-of-evidence foot-printing system ity for weapons, ammunition, and
munity training. The ambition
of CAVR and MAG is to deliver designed to stand up in court. A multi-level explosives12
permission system restricts access only to
a solution that proves as useful
Much has been written,13 includusers selected by the client.
to the AVR and physical secuing in this publication,14,15 to
rity and stockpile management
encourage practitioners and donors
(PSSM) communities as the Information Management System for to think more broadly—to look beyond the mere collection and
Mine Action (IMSMA) has been to humanitarian demining.
destruction of a few illicit or excess arms and explosives identified
A tool such as ArmsTracker could be seen as long overdue. In a as the immediate problem, and more toward recording and manquarter-century of discussion on the importance of PSSM of con- aging the much larger quantities at risk of diversion and misuse.
ventional arms, effective record-keeping for state-owned muni- These are the weapons, ammunition, and explosives held in existing
tions has been one of the most persistent recommendations raised. stockpiles. Their large numbers, lack of effective management, and
Despite these urgings, military, law enforcement, border control, persistent leakage from unsecured storage suggest that disarmaand other state-owned small arms, ammunition, and explosives are ment programs will never be enough.
typically undocumented or poorly-recorded in communities most
Around the world, countries maintain record-keeping practices
at risk of weapons diversion and armed violence.10 This pressing for state-owned arms and ammunition via national legislation.16
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Governments are very experienced at maintaining these and other
public safety processes. The EU records the details of twentythree million cows from birth to death. India keeps records of
281 million cooking gas bottles, and 1.5 billion motor vehicles
are individually recorded worldwide. But in all this, the international community has yet to promote a comprehensive, low-cost
digitized record-keeping system for weapons, ammunition, and
explosives to help low-capacity states prevent diversion and illicit
use, curb armed violence, and comply with international norms.
Partial solutions have been attempted. In the years 2009–2020,
the Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region, the
Horn of Africa, and Bordering States (RECSA) deployed its Small
Arms Tracing System Software to eight of fifteen member states in
support of fifty-one weapons-marking machines. The aim was to
permanently identify state-owned small arms and light weapons
(SALW).17 From 2017 to 2019, The HALO Trust installed a bespoke
system to digitally record the SALW stockpile of the Armed Forces
of Bosnia and Herzegovina.18 The UN and other agencies have also
maintained computerized records for armed peacekeeping operations, but several seem to have fallen into disuse. More recently,
Conflict Armament Research previewed its web-based application
for arms record-keeping using hand-held devices in Somalia.19
Such efforts commonly focus on military forces whose specialist units and trained personnel already manage defense matériel
with purpose-built asset management systems. Yet a larger need is
often felt by less-resourced military, law enforcement, border control, and other state agencies responsible for their own arms and
ammunition, along with seized or excess weapons held as evidence
or for destruction. In the absence of documented accountability,
these are frequently the weapons that leak into criminal and terrorist misuse.
In Africa, key regional agreements such as the SADC Protocol
on the Control of Firearms (2001), 20 the Nairobi Protocol (2004), 21
the ECOWAS Convention (2006), 22 and the Kinshasa Convention
(2010), 23 all of which oblige Member States to digitally record small
arms, remain largely unrealized in the absence of simple, suitable
software.24 Also lacking from past solutions has been software integration to respond to provisions in the relatively recent ATT.
Major donors including the EU25 have indicated support for such
a system. The specifications have already been written. These range
from the instructions contained in the UN’s International Tracing
Instrument (ITI)26 and the precise detail provided by the UN Office
for Disarmament Affairs’ MOSAIC modules, 27 to the grassroots
handbook for UN disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) practitioners that stipulates “a simple database” with
“close-up and full-frame photographs…of each piece of matériel.28
ArmsTracker carefully follows all these guidelines.
Each ArmsTracker installation faces significant challenges.
Small island states in the Pacific with unarmed police, no military,
and few arms and ammunition imports or exports may assign a
low priority to addressing arms management. In Africa where
the need is much greater, lack of institutional capacity, political and security-related suspicions, the vagaries of international

assistance, and above all else, the need to sustain such a system in
the long term will always provide hurdles to overcome. With these
problems in mind, a simple and affordable, globally standardized
software solution with the long-term support of experienced incountry AVR capacity-builders such as MAG will be crucial.
For more information on ArmsTracker security, tamper protection, arms and ammunition identification, scalability, and other
features, please visit https://armstracker.org. Qualifying government agencies are encouraged to visit a live, password-protected
online demonstration of the software tailored to their purpose.
The button on our website marked “Software Evaluation Copy”
invites agency officials to interact with a full-featured version of
ArmsTracker on the web.
See endnotes page 71
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UNEXPLORED
OPPORTUNITIES:

Multi-Sector Strategies for
Collaboration in Underwater
Unexploded Ordnance Remediation
By Chris Price [ Oklahoma State University ]

F

ew global challenges are as ripe for multi-sector collaboration as underwater (UW) unexploded
ordnance (UXO) remediation. Millions of metric tons of UXO are lying on and under the seabed
corroding, decaying, and seeping toxic chemicals into the ecosystem—ultimately ending up in
our food. Because most underwater UXO are from WWI and WWII, and given the corrosion rates of
most metals from which ordnance is made, the inevitable problems with ordnance dumped, sunk, and
fired into bodies of water (mostly in coastal regions) are catching up with us. The urgency is exacerbated by biochemical changes in oceans due to climate change that increase rates of corrosion and
other processes. Meanwhile, maritime technologies in several sectors have reduced the barrier of
entry even for small companies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to partner with militaries,
corporations, and nations, large and small. With combined resources, expertise, and knowledge, these
partnerships can remediate the ecological, economic, explosive, and human health hazards caused by
underwater UXO. While some technological gaps exist in detection, disposal, and removal operations,
the most significant barriers are political and economic. Nevertheless, multi-sector collaboration combined with innovation from maritime and explosives experts offers some unexplored opportunities to
increase health, wealth, and safety for all.

Why UW UXO? Why Now?
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Figure 1. Documented marine sites with munitions present include conventional weapons, chemical weapons, and UXO. Note that
the map resolution is coarser than the number of actual munitions dumps, e.g., the letter h has 148 UXO dumpsites.
Figure courtesy of Frontiers in Marine Science.1

64

THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

Underwater ordnance presents obvious hazards to
fishermen, divers, vessels, and others in coastal regions.
While some are unlikely to detonate if they were dumped
from storage configurations as a means of disposal,
other UW UXO sites contain missiles, torpedoes, mines,
bombs, and other munitions that were once fired but
failed to function as designed—these present the greatest
risk, since small disturbances could result in catastrophe.
Even dumped ordnance, however, leaks toxic chemicals
from hydrocarbon compounds such as RDX and TNT.
These chemicals and byproducts (after partial decomposition in the local areas) result in lethal reactions with
the surrounding ecosystem that affect coral, marine
mammals, and fish. In turn, these point source contaminants get into the local human population’s food supply, particularly in coastal regions, which tend to rely heavily on seafood. If
the perceived threat to public health spreads, contaminated food
supplies could result in economic devastation that would wipe out
the entire fishing industry.
Over the last few decades, the urgency has increased to a point
that health and economic risks will reach national or even regional
levels. This increase in concern is due primarily to two factors: (1)
increased industrial activity in the maritime environment (offshore wind farms, dredging, and laying of seabed infrastructure);
and (2) the corrosion rates of metals used for ordnance casings.
Approximately eighty years have passed since countries dumped
WWII UXO and one hundred years since countries dumped WWI
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UXO and chemical weapons. Given corrosion rates of carbon steels,
aluminum, and other relevant metals encasing these hazards, what
used to be inevitable is now imminent. According to a 2018 study
in Indonesia involving university and government scientists analyzing corrosion in steel and galvanized steel, corrosion rates are
often logarithmic with higher initial rates until a steady state rate is
achieved. For example, for the first month, galvanized steel can corrode between 7 and 9 mm per year (mpy) and mild steel can corrode
as quickly as 25.5–29.5 mpy.3
After that initial period with higher corrosion rates, an oxide film
forms due to cathodic and anodic reactions, as well as biological
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Figure 2. Underwater UXO survey by NGOs in the Pacific Ocean.
Figure courtesy of Chalres Brown, Platinum East.
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Figure 3. Dimensions of 122 mm OF-462 projectile.
Figure courtesy of Defence Technology. 2
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growth, so the rate stabilizes for years
or decades.4 For steady state corrosion rates after the oxide film forms,
several studies corroborate approximately 0.1 mpy of corrosion on metals
Find
such as steel.5,6,7 Thus, the majority of
Industry
UXO, chemical weapons, and related
Government
hazards likely have between 8 and
Assess
10 mm of deterioration due to steady
NGO
state corrosion over 80 to 100 years
in addition to what the initial higher
Military
Remove
rates produced. A typical UXO such
as the 122 mm OF-462 projectile in
Academia
Figure 3 has a wall thickness ranging
Dispose
from a couple millimeters up to 15 or
more millimeters.8 Assuming worst
case conditions, WWII UXO dumped
in 1945 could already have corroded sufficiently to result in toxic
chemical leakage in the 1950s, with a more reasonable estimate
ranging from 80 to 150 years for most ordnance. Other factors also
play a role in determining corrosion rates such as depth and salinity,
as well as pH, which recently has increased due to climate change
and ocean acidification, which in turn increases the rates of reaction involved in corroding ordnance shells.9
Even with reliable models, in situ measurements of oceanographic conditions and ordnance reconnaissance from trained
experts are critical. Corrosion rates (and therefore the data to feed
risk analysis) are based on variables such as water depth, bathymetry, temperature, salinity, dissolved oxygen levels, pH, conductivity, sediment transport conditions, tidal and current activity,
presence of bio-deposits, and exposure to climatological changes.
This variability of conditions in underwater UXO remediation
emphasizes the importance of corporations and governments—
who have resources and personnel to do large area sweeps to

Funding

Technology

Access

Knowledge

Figure 4. Multi-sector assessment of underwater UXO assets
and capabilities. The colors presented indicate which sector
has a significant strength or advantage in that attribute.
Figure courtesy of the author.

localize UXO sites and collect imagery—to partner with universities, NGOs, and local governments who have historical knowledge
of a particular area of interest.
One example of universities and NGOs partnering is demonstrated by the recent establishment of the Oklahoma State
University (OSU) Institute for Global Explosive Hazard Mitigation.
OSU is partnering with Johns Hopkins University, Golden West
Humanitarian Foundation, Platinum East, and Bomb Techs
Without Borders to conduct research in EOD tools, provide postconflict trauma support, and even conduct explosive remediation
operations of ground and underwater threats. While striving to
make the world safer, the partnerships create an environment for
students and practitioners to develop themselves through graduate
education, meaningful research, and global networks of experts.10

The Whole Is Greater Than the Sum of the Parts
It is tempting to blame the militaries of the world for dumped
munitions. They developed, tested, and discarded UXO, munitions filled with chemical agents, and other hazards throughout
preparation for war and in peace time as items became expensive
to store and eventually unserviceable. The reality is that militaries
do not have the “capacity, skill set, funding, or mandate” to assess
environmental hazards of underwater UXO, prioritize remediation, and unilaterally execute removal and disposal procedures.11
NGOs dedicated to the removal and remediation of UXO do
have the mandate and skillsets to focus on the problem but often
lack the capacity and funding. Governments do not always include
mitigation of environmental hazards directly or indirectly derived
from underwater UXO; however, the UXO often originates from
nations whose governments do have the funding. Furthermore,
many militaries apply (or could apply) substantial resources toward
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the problem. Alternatively, whereas large companies from the private sector such as those in the oil and gas industry do not have the
incentive to remove UXO since there is little profit in doing so, they
do have the funding to finance remediation efforts as well as the
skillsets in subsea and seabed detection technologies. Many tools
such as synthetic aperture sonar (SAS), magnetometers, gradiometers, magnetic anomaly detector (MAD), and sub-bottom profilers are used in infrastructure maintenance and natural resource
exploration. Their surface platforms and unmanned systems also
have the skillsets and capacity to conduct large-scale remediation
operations with sufficient standoff to minimize risk to personnel.
For removal or disposal, environmental groups and local governments are often concerned that countercharging UW UXO
will result in worse problems such as irreversible damage to coral
and other marine life. However, other technologies have been

explored and some are quite mature
# Commonalities Industry Government NGO
Military
Academia
with years or decades of datapoints. To
Industry
9
6
9
3
minimize blast effects from ordnance
Government
9
8
9
6
disposal by countercharge, divers can
place bubble curtains around the detonaNGO
6
8
8
6
tion site, especially between the site and
Military
9
9
8
4
any nearby marine life or property. The
Academia
3
6
6
4
bubbles escaping a pressurized hose have
significant blast effect reduction such
that coral, fish, or infrastructure located meters from a detonation Figure 5. Homophily16 of underwater UXO sectors' attributes.
site even in the hundreds of kilograms can have an exponentially Figure courtesy of the author.
higher probability of survival after the detonation.12 Sometimes
are even technological advantages NGOs have used, born primarlocal or state governments decide to leave hazards in place, which
ily out of a culture of operating and innovating in financially conmay have made more practical sense twenty years ago when search
strained organizations. Academic institutions offer search and
and removal technologies were less mature and corrosion was less
detection technologies, novel means of UXO removal, and a wide
likely. For example, the state of Hawaii’s Department of Land and
array of environmental assessment technologies and techniques.
Natural Resources announced in 2020 that it will wait until nonexWhile there is likely a company, NGO, or military that has
plosive removal options are available to remove hundreds to thouattributes in each of the categories (funding, technology, access,
sands of tons of ordnance in a crater off the coast of Maui used
and knowledge) for each of the fundamental phases of underas bombing practice by the US military in WWII, citing concerns
water UXO remediation (find, assess, remove, dispose), Figure 4
from environmental groups, lawmakers, and community memoffers an analytical framework to assess the problem from a multibers about the coral and marine life near the Molokini Crater.13
sector perspective. While this chart is notional based on a literature
However, combining expertise from industry, military, and acareview on a broad, international scale, analysts and practitioners
demia on various low-tech solutions for explosive and chemical
can use this framework on a regional, national, or local level to
hazards can lead to removal of ordnance in a way that is safe to
assess where industry, government, military, NGO, and academic
people, wildlife, and the environment.14
organizations have strengths and weaknesses in different areas.
Because no single sector has all the financial
resources, technological expertise, access,
placement, authorities, and local knowledge of
underwater UXO on a global or regional scale,
multi-sector collaboration is critical.
Each sector has their strengths. Maritime industries such as oil
and gas corporations have copious amounts of funding and modern technologies for search and detection.
Various companies have vast capacities to finance NGOs, academic studies, and governmental or military efforts in underwater
UXO remediation; indeed, some even have the fiduciary responsibility since unintended consequences (detonation, toxic leakage
into the ecosystem) would not be in the best interest of companies’
shareholders. UW UXO remediation may be the primary mission
for some companies or just one division of operations. Frequently,
companies form strategic partnerships for either a single project or
enduring relationships.15
Governmental bodies (for purposes of this analysis, excluding the
military and defense departments) have the knowledge and access
to assess public health hazards to the ecosystem and food supply.
It may even be a politically beneficial policy to improve remediation efforts on UXO since coastal nations rely heavily on the fishing
industry for economic development.
NGOs offer significant value in access and knowledge based on
their sustained presence in a region as well as persistent investment (in time, money, and people) in a particular UXO site. There

Figure 6. SNMCMG1 conducts HODOPS in France.
Figure courtesy of NATO.19
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Figure 7. U.S. Marine Corps Littoral Explosive Ordnance Neutralization (LEON) assets remove WWII ordnance from littoral zones
in the Republic of Palau as part of a Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team. 21
Figure courtesy of United States Marine Corps. 22

More importantly, once an assessment is completed at the
appropriate level for single or multiple UXO sites, collaboration
plans will help optimize resources, authorities, and expertise. For
example, based on the multi-sector assessment from Figure 4, the
chart in Figure 5 totals the number of common areas in which each
sector has similar strengths or the homophily16 of each sector’s
attributes in relation to the others. The highest numbers show the
intersection of two sectors that should share best practices, such as
government/industry and military/industry, since they have similar strengths but have different missions. The lowest scores such
as industry/academia and military/academia indicate that these
groups may not always have the most overlap in strengths; therefore, they must work together the most in order to leverage complimentary resources, expertise, access, and technology.
A recipe for success that has been demonstrated by strategic
partnerships usually has several key ingredients:
• local governments and stakeholders interested in supporting explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) efforts and providing
local knowledge and access to UXO/EOD technicians
• NGOs with a long-term presence in areas that also have local
knowledge of the UXO sites and have developed relationships with local populations, governments, and industries
• militaries, and/or international coalitions (i.e., NATO) providing EOD and UXO technicians with dive capabilities and
autonomous or towed survey equipment, explosive charges,
and other key matériel for operations

•

industry partners providing financial support to NGOs and
local governments, and matériel for the UXO remediation
effort
• academia from nearby or international universities collecting environmental and survey data for analysis to assess
hazards and progress throughout remediation operations as
well as developing new technologies and techniques (often
funded by governments and industry)
This mixture of different sectors all providing their own
strengths does not imply that all NGOs are poorly funded, or that
militaries cannot also have long-term presence. But militaries
tend to utilize forces in exercises and deployments for UW UXO
remediation, but not usually for full, multi-year tours, especially
in remote locations. Nevertheless, organizations such as NATO
leverage resources, platforms, and professionals to conduct historical ordnance disposal operations (HODOPS) such as in Figure
6, which included U.S. (EOD Mobile Unit 8), French, Portuguese,
and Latvian navies disposing of WWII bottom mines, some of
which were found by local fishermen.17 Other times, in the course
of laying telecommunications cables in which dredging operations uncover UXO, corporations will provide funding to private
UXO companies or NGOs to clear the hazards prior to continuing
development.18
In the Asia-Pacific, arguably the most heavily littered region for
UW UXO, various components of U.S. EOD forces collaborate with
allies and partners, as well as NGOs, to clear ordnance as safely as
possible for both personnel and the environment.20

Conclusion
First, consider technical factors of ordnance corrosion, biochemical consequences of explosive fillers once leaked, and
oceanographic processes in vicinity of the UXO site to prioritize
operations. In general, corrosion will be faster when pH is higher,
the site is in shallower water, and tidal activities are rapid.
Second, when forming a coalition across sectors to reduce UW
UXO, first conduct an assessment at the appropriate level and

68

THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

scope. For a local region or single site, assess NGOs, industries,
and nearby EOD assets to see who has resources, expertise, technologies, and access to quickly remediate the highest risk items.
Leverage governments and academic institutions for environmental assessment methods to both prioritize operations and monitor
progress throughout remediation efforts. NGOs are usually in the
business of developing local relationships and staying in an area

Figure 8. U.S. Navy EOD Mobile Unit 5 technician operating a remotely operated vehicle during humanitarian mine action
operations with Sri Lanka Navy partners.
Figure courtesy of United States Navy. 23

for extended periods of time (sometimes decades), and can use
their access and knowledge to quickly find UXO sites and utilize
local labor, resources, and innovative techniques from recognized
experts in the field. Oil, gas, telecommunications, and other industries offer financial resources (either as a benefactor for philanthropic purposes or as a resource sponsor due to mutual interests
in clearing UXO) as well as relevant technologies such as searching
equipment and vessels.
Finally, militaries offer expertise in EOD operations, searching
equipment, explosive materials for countercharging, and a clearly
defined mandate to dispose or remove explosive hazards. When
these various parties learn from each other when their capabilities overlap, and partner on projects when their capabilities do not
overlap, optimal utilization of resources can lead to less unintended
detonations from fishing activity, less toxic chemicals in the water,
cleaner fish for the population’s food supply, and more economic
activity for the region. It just takes some innovation and willingness to collaborate with nontraditional partners to get after it.
See endnotes page 71
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Opportunities for Synergy in HMA: Forensics
For our 25th edition, The Journal features articles on multi-disciplinary approaches to
mine action. For this issue, we focus on the application of forensic science to HMA.
Humanitarian forensic action is the application of forensic science to humanitarian
action. What can HMA operators learn from forensic practitioners regarding the recovery,
identification, and management of human remains found in contaminated urban areas
to ensure that international legal and ethical standards are met? Alternatively, what can
forensic specialists learn from EOD operators who must consider the risk of explosive
hazards in post-conflict environments?
Addressing Legacy War Contamination: Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia
The Indochina Wars left Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam with some of the highest levels of
explosive contamination in the world, including landmines, cluster munition remnants,
and other ERW. What role has EORE taken in primary and secondary schools? How
are organizations expanding these countries’ capacities to develop their mine action
programs? What are the latest advances in survey techniques that can better identify
cluster munition strike footprints?

A roving response team in Laos prepares to destroy UXO.
Photo courtesy of MAG (Mines Advisory Group).

Inquire or submit materials to cisr-journal@jmu.edu
The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction
Center for International Stabilization and Recovery
James Madison University, MSC 4902
Harrisonburg, VA 22807 / USA
Phone: +1 540 568 2718
Website: http://jmu.edu/cisr
For complete submission guidelines, please visit
http://jmu.edu/cisr/journal/submission-guidelines.shtml
Subscribe to The Journal at
http://jmu.edu/cisr/journal/subscribe.shtml
View CFPs online at
http://jmu.edu/cisr/journal/cfps.shtml

The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction is sponsored by
1
02

6
199 –2

Celebrating 25 Years of Improving Lives!

The Journal editorial staff reserves the right to reject submissions, including
text copied from other sources in part or as a whole. Works that have been
published previously and for which the author retains publishing rights may
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Afghanistan and Tajikistan
Challenging mountainous terrain and ongoing security concerns complicate mine
clearance efforts in Afghanistan and neighboring Tajikistan. Decades of internal strife
as well as border conflicts have left extensive mine contamination in Afghanistan and,
to a lesser extent, Tajikistan. How are organizations conducting survey and clearance
navigating the remote terrain? What measures do operators take to ensure security and
appropriate casevac in remote areas, and how do organizations provide sufficient RE to
communities with improvised mines?
Nagorno Karabakh
In late 2020, Azerbaijan and Armenia went to war over the Nagorno Karabakh region.
A few mined areas existed prior to this most recent conflict, with reportedly new
contamination ranging from cluster munitions to missiles, shells, and anti-tank mines.
What measures have taken place since November 2020 to begin clearance efforts and
limit the impact these weapons have on civilians?
Implementing Modern Risk Management Systems (or Strategies) for National
Stockpiles
Unplanned explosions at munitions sites have devastating consequences. How can the
community ensure low-capacity countries follow safe practices and maintain acceptable
risk levels for their munitions stockpiles? What opportunities do organizations have
to help countries make better decisions about balancing the costs of investing in
appropriate infrastructure (risk reduction) with taking the responsibility for casualties
and damages incurred by dangerous hazards (risk acceptance)?
Long-Term, Sustainable Training and Capacity-Building Programs in HMA
and CWD
Training-the-trainer programs allow organizations to engage with countries in
sustainable ways, providing long-term solutions. How do organizations use this training
model to foster local capacity-building and what advantages do these approaches
offer? Can organizations implement training in a way that mitigates turnover rates by
incentivizing trainers to stay in-program? How can current methods be improved and
expanded? We are seeking articles on various HMA and CWD programs, including
those specifically applying to physical security and stockpile management of arms and
ammunition.
Environmental Impact of Explosives in Urban Areas
As demonstrated in Syria and Ukraine, the impact of explosives on the environment
and environmental health is immense and far-reaching. From infrastructure, agriculture,
and livelihoods to pollution and toxicity of the air, soil, and groundwater, how are HMA
programs working to be more inclusive of the broad and far-reaching issues created by
ERW in urban areas, and how can they focus more on long-term sustainable solutions?
Impact Assessments and Resource Prioritization
To maximize the effectiveness of their programs, organizations must understand how
explosive contamination affects communities on an individual level. How do operators
obtain the data they need to assess perceived level of safety and socioeconomic wellbeing? And how do organizations leverage this information to create comprehensive
and efficient programs that ensure resources go to those who need them most?

